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Tubbs, John E., Master's, March 1991 Economics
A Montana-Wyoming Coal Severance Tax Duopoly Model (129 pp.)
Director! John W. Duffield
The large coal reserves of the Northern Great Plains represent one 
of the nation's largest energy sources. The states of Montana and 
Wyoming assert market control over these reserves through state 
severance taxes. This report identifies optimal severance tax 
strategies and rates for Montana and Wyoming. In this analysis, 
optimal rates are defined as those that maximize state coal severance 
tax revenues.
A variant of the classic Bertrand price duopoly model is used to 
describe the Northern Great Plains coal market and the role of 
Montana and Wyoming severance taxes. Bertrand described a case (diere 
two producers maximize profits by controlling a commodity's price. 
In this analysis, severance tax rates are adjusted to maximize state 
tax revenues. Montana and Wyoming reaction functions aure derived for 
naive and tax-leadership behavioral assumptions. These reaction 
functions describe how each state would react to a change in the 
other state's severance tax rate.
Using demand forecasts as an empirical base, the theoretical model 
is applied and optimal tax rates are calculated. The demand for 
Montana and Wyoming coal is forecasted using a spatial market model. 
Numerous coal demand forecasts are made for severance tax rates 
ranging from 0 to 120 percent in each state. These forecasts are 
then used to identify demand functions using simple regression 
techniques. The results suggest that severance tax rates of 75 
percent for Montana and 119 percent for Wyoming would maximize each 
state's coal severance tax revenues.
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Since the early seventies. Northern Great Plains <NGP) 
coal production has increased dramatically. Montana coal 
production went from 3.45 million tons in 1970 (Commission 
1980, 93) to 37.77 million tons in 1989 (DOE 1990a, 17).
Wyoming coal production went from 7.22 million tons in 
1970 (Commission 1980, 93) to 171.45 million tons in 1989 
(DOE 1990b, 5). The strilcing difference in the demand for 
Montana coal as compared to Wyoming coal is due to the 
proximity of Wyoming coal reserves to the large population 
centers in the in the mid-west (Duffield and others 1985, 
II-7). Along with increasing production, both states
initiated substantial severance taxes.
Montana and Wyoming coal severance taxes have been the 
topic of several research efforts. The analysis presented 
in this thesis is an extension of a series of reports 
analyzing the NGP coal demand. In the first report. 
Projections of Northern Great Plains Coal Minina and 
Enerav Conservation Development. 1975-2000 A.D. (Power and 
others 1976) a spatial market boundary between NGP coal 
and Midwest coal reserves was estimated. However, no 
other market boundaries were estimated. Estimates of a 
fully bounded NGP spatial market were reported in 
Projections of Coal Demand from the Norther Great Plains 
through the Year 2010 (Duffield and others 1982). In a
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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third report, Montana Coal Market to the Year 2000; Impact 
of Severance Tax. Air Pollution Control, and Reclamation 
Costs (Duffield and others 1985), coal supply centers for 
Montana and Wyoming were introduced into the model. This 
allowed the competition between the coal producing states 
of Montana and Wyoming to be modeled.
This thesis takes the analysis of the impact of 
severance taxes presented in the 1985 report the a step 
further and develops optimal tax strategies. Optimal coal 
tax strategies are defined as those that maximize state 
severance tax revenues. The analysis presented in this 
thesis is not the first analysis of Montana and Wyoming 
cartel control over NGP coal. In 1983, Charles D. Kolstad 
and Frank A. Wolak jr. published an article entitled 
"Competition in Interregional Taxation: The Case of
Western Coal” presenting a similar analysis. Michael P. 
Ward analyzed Montana and Wyoming market control in Coal 
Severance Taxes : The Effects of Western State's Tax Policv 
on the U.S. Coal Market (Ward 1982). A third study. The 
Western Coal Tax Cartel (Zimmerman and Alt 1981) also 
analyzed the market power of Montana and Wyoming. These 
reports will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 2.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
OVERVIEW
This thesis is broken into five chapters. Chapter 1 
provides this overview and a brief survey of Montana and 
Wyoming coal resources. Chapter 2 is a literature review 
of coal cartel models and coal demand models. Chapters 3 
present the analytic components needed to calculate 
optimal severance tax rates. A variant of the classic 
Bertrand duopoly model is used to describe Montana and 
Wyoming market control. It is important to note that, in 
this case, the coal severance tax rate is the decision
variable, not price. Montana and Wyoming reaction
functions are then used to identify optimal severance tax 
strategies.
Chapter 3 also provides a description of the spatial 
market model used to forecast coal demand. These demand
forecasts provide the empirical data upon which optimal 
rates are estimated. There are numerous factors affecting 
the demand for Montana and Wyoming coal. However, the
pivotal factor for this analysis is the influence of
Montana and Wyoming severance tax rates on the delivered 
price of coal and, in turn, coal demand. Based on
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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severance taxes ranging from 0 to 120 percent, 169 
combinations of Montana and Wyoming coal severance tax 
rates are used to forecast coal demand.
Chapter 4 presents the empirical analysis. First, the 
demand forecasts are presented. Using simple regression 
techniques, Montana and Wyoming coal demand equations are 
estimated. The OLS parameters are then substituted into 
the optimal tax strategies derived in Chapter 3. The 
result is an identification of optimal tax rates which 
would maximize Montana and Wyoming revenues.
Chapter 5 provides an a review of the major assumptions 
and a summary of the empirical results as they compare to 
three previous studies. Chapter 5 also provides a summary 
of the major conclusions that are reached.
MONTANA AND WYOMING COAL RESOURCES
The coal resources of the world represent approximately 
half of the energy recoverable from the earth's crust 
(Silverman 1983, 5). The large, low-sulfur coal reserves
of the Northern Great Plains (NGP) are one of the nation's 
largest energy resources. Figure 1 shows the location of 
major coal reserves in the United States.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Over ninety-five percent of the coal produced in the NGP 
is used for steam electric generation (DOE 1988a, 20).
The 1982 coal study conducted by Duffield and others 
identified seven competing coal supply centers. Each of 
these coal producing regions compete against Montana and 
Wyoming coal for market shares. The analysis presented in 
this thesis focuses on the Powder River coals of Wyoming 
and Montana and treats the Green River coals of Wyoming as 
a competing supply region.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Montana Coal Resources
The coal fields in Montana underlie approximately 35 
percent of the total land area of the state (Keystone 
1989, 526). The Fort Union Formation contains coal
deposits ranging from low Btu lignite deposits, in 
northeast Montana, to subbituminous coal along the 
northern part of the Powder River Basin (Brown 1983, 205). 
Approximately, one quarter of the demonstrated reserves in 
the U.S. are in Montana. This represents 57 percent of 
the demonstrated subbituminous coal reserves and 35 
percent of demonstrated lignite. The 1989 Kevstone Coal 
Industrv Manual (Keystone 1989, 527) estimates that
remaining coal reserves in Montana total 471,630 million 
tons, of which about 50 million tons are strippable.
Coal mining in Montana was reported as early as 1807 
when a Spanish fur trader heated his trading post with 
lignite coal (Keystone 1989, 531). Today, nine surface
mines produce most, if not all, of the coal produced in 
Montana (Keystone 1989, 531). Table 1 provides historic
coal production for Montana from 1970 through 1989.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Table 1. Montana Coal Production*
Year Production 
(millions 
of tons)
Year Production 
(millions 
of tons)
1970 3. 447 1980 29.981
1971 7.064 1981 33.332
1972 8. 221 1982 27.838
1973 10.725 1983 28.660
1974 14.106 1984 33.054
1975 22.054 1985 33.141
1976 26.231 1986 33.743
1977 29.320 1987 34.377
1978 26.679 1988 38.920
1979 34.454 1989 37.772
* Sources* 1970 - 1977 (Commission 1980, 93), 1978
(DNRC 1989, 49), 1989 (DOE 1990a, 17).
- 1988
The first Montana coal tax, a 5 cent per ton license 
fee, was imposed in 1921. Over 50 years later, Montana's 
coal tax legislation was "overhauled" and a new 30 percent 
severance tax was established (Verdon 1988, 53). In 1987, 
bowing to pressure from the governor and the coal 
industry, the legislature approved a phased reduction in 
the severance tax rate. A bench mark level of production 
was set at 32.2 million tons. In 1988, coal production 
exceeded this bench mark and the severance tax rate was 
lowered to 20 percent. Without new legislation, the coal 
severance tax will be reduced to 15 percent in 1991 
(Verdon 1988, 54).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Wyoming Coal Resources
Two major coal bearing provinces cross Wyoming. Coal 
in the Eastern part of the state falls into the Northern 
Great Plains province (Keystone 1989, 611). The coals in 
this province are dominated by subbituminous rank coals. 
These are the coals that are the focus of the analysis 
presented in this paper. The deposits in other parts of 
the state are part of the Rocky Mountain Province 
(Keystone 1989, 611).
According to the 1989 Kevstone Coal Manual, coal has 
been produced continuously in Wyoming since World War I 
(Keystone 1989, 617). In 1958, production fell to an all 
time low of 1.6 million tons. However, beginning in the 
late 1960s coal production began to increase and now 
Wyoming is the largest coal producing state in the nation 
(DOE 1990b, 5). Annual production totals are presented in 
Table 2 from 1970 through 1989.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
11
Table 2. Wyoming Coal Production*
Year Production Year Production
(millions (millions
of tons) of tons)
1970 7.222 1980 94.033
1971 8.052 1981 101.661
1972 10.928 1982 107.084
1973 14.886 1983 112.213
1974 20.703 1984 130.914
1975 23.804 1985 140.714
1976 30.836 1986 136.820
1977 44.500 1987 146.850
1978 58.328 1988 164.014
1979 70.795 1989 171.454
* Sources : 1970 - 1977 (Commission 1980, 93), 1978 (DOE
1980, 11), 1980 (DOE 1981a , 5), 1980 (DOE 1982a, 7), 1981
(DOE 1982b, 2), 1982 (DOE 1983, 2), 1983 (DOE 1984a, 2) ,
1984 (DOE 1985, 3), 1985 (DOE 1986, 4), 1986 (DOE 1988b,
13), 1987 (DOE 1988c, 8), 1988 (DOB 1989, 15), and 1989
(DOE 1990b , 5).
Wyoming's current severance tax rate is 8 and 1/2
percent. From 1979 through 1986 the tax rate was 10 and
1/2 percent. This two percent reduction took effect when 
the cumulative coal severance tax revenues exceeded $160 
million (39-6-303 Wyoming Statutes Annotated) which
occurred in 1986. Prior to 1979 a series of adjustments
were made to the severance tax which took it from one
percent in 1969 to 10.1 percent in 1978 (Wyoming
Department of Revenue 1990).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
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INTRODUCTION
Two components are needed to study Montana and Wyoming 
coal severance tax policies. First, a theoretical model 
of how each state will react to the others coal tax 
policies is developed. Next, an empirical analysis is 
preformed to identify optimal tax rates. This is done by 
first forecasting 1990 coal demand for a range of 
severance tax rates and then, through regression analysis, 
use these forecasts to empirically estimate the parameters 
identified in the theoretical model. The first section of 
this chapter provides a review and comparison of other 
studies analyzing Montana and Wyoming cartel control over 
NGP coal production. The second section provides a review 
of three coal demand forecasting models.
MONTANA-WYOMING COAL PRODUCTION COMPETITION
Kolstad and Wolak
In many ways the analysis presented in this thesis is 
fashioned after the duopoly analysis presented in 
Competition in Interregional Taxation: The Case of Western 
Coal (Kolstad and Wolak 1983). Kolstad and Wolak develop
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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a theoretical model of Montana and Wyoming competition 
where the severance tax rate is the decision variable. 
While the general approach developed in this thesis is 
similar, the specific construct of the theoretical models 
and the coal forecasting models differ.
Kolstad and Wolak (1983, 450) establish a five equation
model of the competition between these two coal producing 
states (see Table 3). The five equations are solved 
simultaneously to identify optimal coal tax policies.
Table 3. Equilibrium conditions - Kolstad and Wolak 
(1983, 450).
P. - (1 + t ,) . ( or, + ^ ,.q.) + e ,
P. - (1 + t ,) . ( or ̂ + /5*qJ + e ,
Pd = + b,.(q, + q.) + e ̂
Tj ■ Cj + dj-Pj + ttj for i = m,w
Pd “ Pi + r i for i - m,w 
where :
or, a, b, c, and d are coefficients; 
e,, e ,, B y  and n , are error terms;
P, - FOB price of Montana coal;
P, « FOB price of Wyoming coal;
P̂  » delivered price of coal;
Fj - transportation cost;
t, - Montana severance tax rate ;
t, - Wyoming severance tax rate;
q, « Quantity of Montana coal demanded;
q, - Quantity of Wyoming coal demanded.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Kolstad and Wolak (1983^ 451) found that, for the
simplest cartel strategy of adopting a single rate, the 
optimal coal severance tax rate is 87 percent. If 
"noncooperative” conditions are assumed, revenue 
maximizing, equilibrium rates would be 27 percent for
Montana and 33 percent for Wyoming. If price-leadership, 
non-cooperative conditions are assumed, Montana and 
Wyoming would raise tax rates to approximately 35 percent. 
Kolstad and Wolak (1983, 453) also report, if standard
Cournot conditions are assumed, Montana would set rates at 
57 percent and Wyoming at 67 percent. At the end of
Chapter 5, these rates will be compared to the optimal
rates developed in this thesis.
Ward
Michael Ward's research had a slightly different twist. 
Ward (1982) analyzed the potential for Montana and Wyoming 
to impact national coal production and energy prices by 
extorting economic rents through the coal severance tax. 
Ward did not impose any duopoly model. Instead, he used a 
number of coal demand forecasts, based on different 
severance tax rate scenarios, to identify possible 
national impacts. In this regard. Ward's analysis is
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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similar to the approach used in the 1985 report Montana 
Coal Market to the Year 2000: Impact of Severance Tax. Air 
Pollution Control, and Reclamation Costs (Duffield and 
others 1985).
Ward's analysis focused on the degree to which higher 
taxes might reduce coal production in Montana and Wyoming 
which would, in turn, reduce national production and drive 
coal and energy prices up (Ward 1982). Secondly, he 
analyzed what decision rules state governments use in 
setting their severance taxes. To answer these questions. 
Ward used five scenarios : ” (1) reducing all severance
taxes to zero; (2) limiting all severance tax rates to 
12.5 percent; (3) lowering Montana's severance tax to that 
of Wyoming; (4) raising Wyoming's tax to that of Montana; 
and (5) raising both Montana's and Wyoming's severance tax 
to 70 percent" (Ward 1982, 37). He also analyzed the
effect of transportation costs on the state production 
taxes.
Based on this analysis. Ward concluded Western tax 
policies would only have minor impacts on the national 
coal market. Midwestern utilities would be impacted most; 
however, substitution of Eastern coal mitigated a large 
portion of the costs (Ward 1982, 53). Ward also found
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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transportation rates are much more important than state 
severance taxes to the marketability of western coal. 
Even in the "extreme" case where both states raise 
severance tax rates to 70 percent, national production was 
not impacted substantially. However, in this scenario 
Montana and Wyoming production fell by approximately two- 
thirds (Ward 1982, 47).
Table 4 shows the Montana and Wyoming coal severance tax 
revenues presented in Ward's study. Note that Montana 
severance tax revenues drop when the rate is lowered. 
This same result was reported in the 1985 study (Duffield 
and others 1985) and is also true for the estimates 
presented in Chapter 5. Revenues for both states are 
maximized at a rate of 70 percent; the highest rate Ward 
used.
Table 4. Ward's Forecast of 1990 Gross Revenues from 
Severance Taxes'".
12.51 Kootaoa Vfoiio; 701,Both
Tax Tax lowered Tax Raised Kontana
State Reference Limit to Ryoming to Kontana and Vyoiing
Kontana 267.15 144.93 152.58 275.60 489.66
Wyoming 255.27 214.23 234.23 405.25 1,096.52
• Source* Ward (1982, 47).
" All data is in millions of dollars.
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Zimmerman and Alt
Zimmerman and Alt {1981, 26) analyze rates as high as
200 percent. Like Ward (1982), they do not impose a 
duopoly model. Instead, optimal severance tax rates are 
identified by maximizing the present discounted value of 
forecasted tax revenues. Assuming cartel cooperation, the 
optimal rate is 62.5 percent. They explain that while 
this rate seems high, "when considered in terms of what 
railroads have been doing, a 62.5 percent tax is not high" 
(Zimmerman and Alt 1981, 20).
Like Ward (1982), Zimmerman and Alt (1981) found the 
impact of raising Montana and Wyoming severance tax rates 
fell on energy consumers in the Midwest. "The Eastern 
regions (of the U.S.) bear almost no burden of this 
optimal tax" (Zimmerman and Alt 1981, 19). A comparison
of Zimmerman and Alt's results and the optimal tax rates 
calculated in this thesis is provided in Chapter 5.
N6P COAL DEMAND MODEL
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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A spatial market model is used to forecast 1990 coal 
demand. The coal demand forecasts are then used as an 
empirical basis upon which optimal tax rates are 
calculated. The origins of the N6P spatial market model 
are described below along with a review of the models used 
by Ward (1982),. Kolstad and Wolak (1983), and Zimmerman 
and Alt (1981).
Spatial Market Model
In 1976, the Montana University Coal Demand Study Team 
forecasted demand for NGP coal from 1975 through the year 
2000 (Power and others 1976). Two approaches were used to 
estimate coal demand in the 1976 study. The first assumed 
that NGP coal would supply "all the new demand for coal in 
the market area." A simplistic spatial model of the NGP 
coal market was also developed to forecast demand.
The spatial market model developed in the 1976 report 
identified only two competing supply centers (see Figure 
2) and did not account for coal production in the south 
and southwest. Further, no inter-fuel substitution
algorithm was developed to account for competing energy 
sources. Instead, a simplifying assumption that coal
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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would maintain its share of in the energy market was made 
(Power and others 1976).
Several electric demand growth scenarios were modeled in 
the 1976 analysis. Three constant, annual electric growth 
scenarios were modeled * 1, 3, and 5 percent. An
econometric forecast of electric demand was also developed 
which included four scenarios. The key variables in the 
econometric model were the real prices of electricity and 
natural gas. The variables impacting electric demand 
which were analyzed in the 1976 study include : air
pollution standards, cost effectiveness of sulfur removal, 
price and availability of natural gas and petroleum, cost, 
reliability and acceptability of nuclear power, 
institutional constraints to the development of coal, 
transportation and transmission costs, and electric 
consumption demand elasticity.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Figure 2. 1976 Spatial M a r k e t .
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The 1976 spatial analysis was refined in 1982 with the 
publication of Projections of Coal Demand from the 
Northern Great Plains through the Year 2010 (Duffield and 
others 1982). The 1982 NGP spatial market model
identified eight competing coal supply centers in 
Illinois, New Mexico, Southwest Wyoming, Colorado, Texas, 
Utah, Washington, and the NGP. This was a considerable 
improvement over the 1976 study and allowed the 
identification of a fully bounded spatial market (see 
Figure 3). The spatial market boundaries accounted for 
all costs associated with burning coal over the life of a 
model coal fired generation plant. Key variables included 
coal rank and quality, plant efficiencies, FOB coal 
prices, and transportation costs (Duffield and others 
1982 ) .
An inter-fuel substitution algorithm was also developed 
for the 1982 study. This algorithm takes the forecasted 
electric demand and divides it among competing energy 
sources including coal, nuclear, hydropower, oil, and gas. 
This was another significant improvement over the 1976 
study which assumed constant market share.
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However, The 1982 NGP spatial market model did not 
identify a market boundary between Montana and Wyoming. 
In 1985, under a grant from the Montana Economic 
Development Council, a report analyzing the impacts of 
severance taxes, air pollution control, and reclamation 
costs was developed (Duffield and others 1985). This
analysis took the NGP spatial market model developed in 
1982 and added a Montana-Wyoming market boundary (see 
Figure 4).
With this addition, forecasts could be made for both 
Montana and Wyoming Powder River coal demand. The
analysis of severance taxes estimated the impact on 
Montana coal demand and tax revenues that 1, 2, 3, and 4
dollar decreases in Montana FOB prices would have.
However, the 1985 analysis presumed that Wyoming would not 
react to tax changes in Montana. Three electric demand
scenarios were used to develop the forecasts : 1, 2, and 3
percent annual growth.
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The 1985 study concluded there would be steady annual 
growth in Montana coal demand and a lowering of the coal 
severance tax would modestly increase the demand for 
Montana coal while annual severance tax revenues would 
drop substantially.
The analysis presented in this thesis uses the 
forecasting model developed for the 1985 report, which 
incorporates the improvements that were made to the NGP 
spatial market model. The key variables in the analysis 
is the FOB prices of Montana and Wyoming coal. The 
analysis presented in this thesis also relaxes the 
assumption that Wyoming will not react to changes in 
Montana's coal severance tax rate and develops a model to 
analyze the competition between these two states.
National Coal Model
The Department of Energy's (DOE) national coal model 
(NOM) is a linear programing model of U.S. coal supply and 
demand coupled with an electric utility resource decision 
model (DOE 1982c). This model was used by both Kolstad 
and Wolak (1983) and Ward (1982). The goal of the linear 
program is to minimize the total cost of electricity 
delivered by utilities, and the cost of coal consumed by
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the non-utility sectors (DOE 1982c, 1). Costs include
coal mining, washing and transport, as well as electricity 
transport and generation costs (Kolstad and Wolak 1983, 
457) .
The advantage of the NCM is that it uses a true 
transportation model of coal shipments to utilities. The 
NCM provides greater accuracy concerning coal shipments in 
comparison to the NGP spatial model, which relies on a 
air-to-rail ratio to identify transportation costs to a 
given geographic area. Further, the NGP spatial market
model is based on state wide electric demand forecasts.
If a state is bisected by a market boundary, the percent 
of standard metropolitan statistical areas (SHSA) 
populations captured within the market are used to weight 
state electric demand. The national coal model is much
more specific about how much power is demanded at each 
node.
However, even with this greater precision, the NCM is 
still only as accurate as the base assumptions concerning 
electric demand growth and the use of competing fuels. 
The modified version of the national coal model used by
Kolstad and Wolak (1983) greatly overestimated the demand 
for Montana and Wyoming coal in 1990. Kolstad and Wolak
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(1983, 451) do not provide a table listing their coal
demand forecasts; but their "Figure 1. Activity analysis 
model" shows forecasted (combined Montana and Wyoming) 
demand for 1990 no lower than 250 million tons and 
exceeding 500 million tons at the high end. In 1989 
combined Montana and Wyoming coal production was 209 
million tons.
Michael Ward (1982, 42) also uses D OE's national coal
model. Interestingly, the "Reference" case present in 
Ward's 1982 analysis is much closer to actual levels of 
coal demand than the forecasts made by Kolstad and Wolak. 
Ward reports a forecasted demand for "West Northern Great 
Plains" of 189.63 million tons in 1990. This suggests 
that the assumptions Kolstad and Wolak make concerning 
energy demand and competing energy sources may be driving 
the high levels of forecasted demand, rather than there 
being a fundamental problem with the NCM.
Zimmerman and Alt Coal Demand Model
Zimmerman and Alt (1981) also use a linear programing 
model to forecast coal supply and demand. One of the
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unique features of their model is that coal production 
cost is modeled as a function of output. As output 
accumulates over time, production cost increase. The link 
is a model of seam thickness which is based on limited 
data from western Kentucky. Zimmerman and Alt (1981, 6) 
identify coal shipment costs based on escalated
transportation rates. The objective function is to 
minimize the sum of costs of mining and transportation.
A "Regional Electricity Model" is used to forecast the 
demand for energy. This model is much more sophisticated 
than the constant annual electric growth model used in the 
NGP spatial market model. The proportion of energy demand 
satisfied by a particular fuel is based on relative
prices. The electricity model calculates an optimum
configuration of capacity given demand and cost 
constraints (Zimmerman and Alt 1981, 8). Coal demand and
supply are linked by estimating some 360 supply curves and 
with the demand model through linear programing techniques 
(Zimmerman and Alt 1981, 10). The linear program
minimizes cost of meeting demand on a yearly basis.
Both d o e 's and Zimmerman and Alt's coal forecasting
models require substantial computing power and are costly 
to run. The NGP spatial model has the advantage of being
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rather simple in comparison to both. Kolstad and Wolak 
(1983, 456) report that the linear program they used
contained approximately 4,000 constraints, 25,000 
variables and was solved using a CRAY 1 computer. The 
computing requirements are much smaller for the NGP 
spatial market model. Further, given the sensitivity of 
all of the forecasting models to assumptions concerning 
electric demand growth and the use of competing fuels, the 
NGP spatial market model can provide very accurate 
results.
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THEORETICAL METHODS
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The duopoly model developed to analyze Montana and 
Wyoming severance tax policies is a variant of the classic 
Bertrand price duopoly model. The difference between 
classic duopoly models and the Montana-Wyoming coal tax 
duopoly model is the use of the coal severance tax rate to 
exercise market power. Cournot and Bertrand duopoly 
models are formulated either in terms of direct control 
over output or price, respectively.
Further, the goal of these classic models is to maximize 
profit. For the Montana-Wyoming coal tax duopoly model, 
the goal is to maximize coal severance tax revenues for 
each state. The severance tax rate, rather than price or 
quantity, is used as the decision variable. Kolstad and 
Wolak (1983, 445} also used the coal severance tax as the 
decision variable stating "it is our view that if tax 
rates are the actual decision variables, then strategies 
for setting taxes will be based on how competitors set 
taxes, not on the indirectly determined output levels of 
competitors."
This chapter describes the classic Cournot and Bertrand 
duopoly models. Then using the same general techniques, a 
Montana-Wyoming coal tax duopoly model is developed. 
Model specification where each state naively assumes the
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other will not react to a change in severance tax rates 
and where one state is a "tax leader" are analyzed. At 
the end of the chapter, the spatial market model is also 
described. The spatial market model is used to forecast 
coal demand. A complete description of this model is 
provided in the appendices of the thesis.
COURNOT DUOPOLY
Cournot (1838) was one of the first to describe a 
duopoly model. In this classic duopoly model, there are 
only two producers of a homogenous product. These 
producers attempt to maximize profits by controlling the 
level of output produced. The Cournot model also makes 
the naive assumption that each producer believes the other 
will not react to a change in his own output.
A mathematical description of the Cournot model is 
presented below. First, the demand and revenue functions 
are described. These are followed by the identification 
of first order and equilibrium conditions. A linear 
demand function and, constant marginal costs are assumed.
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Cournot Duopoly Model 
Pj(q) - a - b*q
q = q, +
PROFIT, - (a - b*q)*q, - c«q,
where a,b,c >* 0;
P, (q ) - Market Demand; 
q, ■ Output of Producer 1; 
q, « Output of Producer 2.
1st Order Conditions -- Producer 1
dProfit
-------- = a - b « ( 2 * q ,  -q, ) - c  » 0
dq,
{a - c) q,q .   - --
2*b 2
1st Order Conditions —  Producer 2 
dProfit
dq,
(a - c) q,
a - b»(2»q, - q, ) - c = 0
<Ii * -----2*b
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The first order conditions describe how each producer 
will react to one another (reaction functions). In order 
to maximize profit, each producer not only takes into 
account market demand and his production, but also the 
amount produced by his competitor. An equilibrium
solution can be calculated by simultaneous substitution of 
the reaction functions. Profits will be maximized at q\ 
and q*j output levels.
Equilibrium -- Producer 1
(a - c) q*,
(a - c)
2b
2-b
(a - c)
q*, - ------3-b
Equilibrium -- Producer 2
(a - c )
(a - c)
2b
2*b
(a - c)
3-b
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BERTRAND DUOPOLY
The Cournot, duopoly model describes a situation where 
the duopolists controlled the market by changing output. 
An obvious alternative is to use price as the decision 
variable. This price duopoly model was first described by 
Bertrand (1883). In Bertrand's model, each producer 
assumes the other will hold price constant, regardless of 
his own actions. This is equivalent to the naive 
assumption in the Cournot analysis where each producer 
assumed the other will hold output constant. In this 
example, a slight differentiation between the products of 
each player is necessary for equilibrium to be achieved. 
It is further assumed that marginal costs are constant.
Bertrand Duopoly Model
D, (p) - a - b»P, + c*Pj
Dj(p) = a - /3»P, + p*Pj
PROFIT, - (a - b'P, + c ' P, ̂ . P,
PROFIT, - {a - #.P, + p.P, ).P,
where a,b,c,a,^,|i >* 0;
D, (p) ■ Demand for producer I's output;
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Dj(p) » Demand for producer 2's output; 
P, * Price set by producer 1;
P, - Price set by producer 2.
As with the Cournot duopoly model, reaction functions 
are calculated based on the first derivative of the profit 
function and setting it equal to zero. Each producer will 
change the price of their product based on both the demand 
for the product and the price of the competing duopolist's 
product.
1st Order Conditions -- Producer 1
dPROFIT,
a -2»b«P, + c *P; - 0
P,
a + c»Pj
2*b
1st Order Conditions —  Producer 2
d P R O F I T j
- “ a -2*/S«P, + p»P, * 0
dPi
a + P'P, 
P, - ---------
Similar to the development of the Cournot model, optimal 
price levels are identified by simultaneous substitution
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of the two producers reaction functions. By setting 
prices at P‘, and P\ , profits will be maximized for each 
producer and an equilibrium solution can be identified.
Equilibrium -- Producer 1
a + M*P*i
P*, - a + c*
2'B
2*b
c-ju a
P‘j*(2«b - --- ) » a + c*----
2.^ 2*/3
2*f*a + C*a
P*. * -------------4*b*^ — c * p
Equilibrium -- Producer 2
a + c«P‘j
P*j - o + p*----------
2-b
P'a
P\
2'#
# - c * p q + p * a
2*b 2*b
2*b*a + a* p 
4*^*b - c*p
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BERTRAND PRICE LEADERSHIP
One weakness of both Cournot's and Bertrand's analyses 
is the assumption that the competing producer will not 
react to changes in output or price. This assumption is 
only true when equilibrium is achieved. A more likely 
situation would be where one of the two competitors had an 
advantage over the other and could afford to lead changes. 
This competitive advantage can be modeled using Bertrand's 
price duopoly model and assuming that one producer 
anticipates his competitors action while the other 
continues to assume the his competitor will not react. In 
other words, the price leader has full knowledge of his 
competitors reaction function and the price follower 
continues to believe his competitor will not change price. 
Mathematically, this is accomplished by substituting 
Producer 2's reaction function into the Producer I's 
profit equation, assuming Producer 1 is the price leader.
Bertrand Price Leadership Model
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PROFIT, » (a - b«lÇ + c»Pj)-P,
a + ^«P,
PROFIT, - a - b-Ç + c*--------- «P,
2'#
PROFIT, - {a - + ji.P, )*P,
1st Order and Equilibrium Condition -- Producer 1
dPROFIT, C « a  2«c»ji«P,
■ ■ = a — 2»b»Pj +   + ———— " 0
dP, 2»p 2*/3
2 ' c « ju C'a
P,*(2»b - ------) - a +----
2'# 2'p
2*/|oa + C'a
P.
A'h' p — 2' C' fi
1st Order Condition -- Producer 2
a +  >i.P,
P,
2'P
Equilibrium -- Producer 2
2*a*^ + c»q
P‘, * q - fi'-----------------
2*(2*b*^ - C' fi)
2p
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2«b«a + a*ji
P‘,  ---------------------------------------4*b — 2• c• fj 4*^*(2*b*^ — c*|i)
Assuming that a, b^ c, a, 0, and ju are all greater than 
zero y a comparison between the equilibrium solution under 
Bertrand's classic assumptions versus the price leadership 
model can be made. As expected, the price leader 
(Producer 1) increases his profits and less profits are 
available to the price follower (Producer 2). This is 
expected because there would be no point to leadership 
otherwise.
Producer 1
2 • 0 • di + c • a 2 • 0 • B. + c«ot
  <  --------------------
4»b«0 — c*^ 4 * b * ̂  — 2 * c *
I___________________ I I__________________________I
Bertrand Price Leadership
Equilibrium Equilibrium
Producer 2
2>b*a + a*ju 2>b>a + a*^ c-^*a
>
4*^*b - c*p 4 * b * ̂  - 2 • c • 4*^»(2*b«^ - c • )
J L
Bertrand Price Leadership Equilibrium
Equilibrium
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HOMTANA-WYOMIN6 COAL TAX DUOPOLY
The descriptions of the Cournot, Bertrand, and Bertrand 
price leadership models all follow the same mathematical 
construct. First, a set of assumptions on how the two 
duopolists will react to each other and the demand and 
revenue functions they face are postulated. Based on 
these assumptions, reaction functions are derived. Then 
equilibrium conditions are developed by a simultaneous 
substitution of the two reaction functions.
These basic steps are now used to develop a Montana- 
Wyoming coal tax duopoly model. The Bertrand model and 
the price leadership model most closely resemble the coal 
tax duopoly model for the obvious reason that the coal 
severance tax rate directly affects the delivered price of 
coal and only indirectly affects the quantity produced. 
Initially, it is assumed that the states of Montana and 
Wyoming will set tax rates based on the naive assumption 
that the other state will not counter by changing its tax 
rate. Once equilibrium conditions are identified under
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
43
this assumption, a price leadership model is developed. 
It is also assumed that both Montana and Wyoming face 
linear demand curves and that marginal cost is constant. 
The first step is then mathematically describing the 
demand and revenue functions.
Montana-Wyoming Coal Tax Duopoly Model
D„ = a - b.(l+t,t)»P„ + c. ( l+t,y)
R„ - (a -
TR,, * (l-*-t,, )»R̂ j - R = t,, »R,,
= t,,»(a - b* ( 1+t,, ) •?,, + C» < 1 + t *P„) «P,,
D|r * o - f l + ) »P,y + JLI» ( l + t„) *P,,
“ a - f ' ( 1 + t,, ) 'P,T + ^•(l + t„)«P,,
TR,| * ( 1 + “ P||T •
“ t ( C - ^*(l + t,y)*P„ + P' ( 1 + t „)'P,()'P,,
where :
Montana;
D,, - Montana coal demand;
P„ = Montana FOB price for coal;
R,, - Montana producer revenue ;
TR„ - Montana tax revenue ;
t,, - Montana tax rate ;
a * Constant for Montana demand (Ĉ , ); 
b - Slope for Montana production (D„ );
c ■ Slope for Wyoming production (D,, ) .
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Wyomingi
• Wyoming Coal demand;
P,T * Wyoming FOB price for coal;
R,t * Wyoming producer revenue;
TR,y - Wyoming tax revenue ;
■ Wyoming tax rate ;
a " Constant for Wyoming demand (%,); 
fi « Slope for Wyoming production (D „ );
fi - Slope for Montana production ).
Now that the demand and revenue functions are described, 
first order conditions are calculated. These first order 
conditions describe how each state will react to changes 
in the other state's severance tax rate. The reaction 
function for Montana is developed first, followed by the 
Wyoming reaction function.
First Order Conditions
Montana Reaction Function
dTR„
dt.,
2*t„.b.P,» - (a - b*P„ + c.P„ + c«t ̂ ,*P„) 
a - b-P.. + c ( l + t „ ) . P „
2-b-P,,
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Wyoming Reaction Function
<JTR„
dt^j
2«t,,*0-P,/ - (a - f'P,T + P'P„ + P'tt,'P.,)'P,T
« - f "P,T + ff ( 1+t „) »P„
t., 2.f .P• T
It is important to note that each state would consider 
the other states severance tax rate when establishing its 
own tax rate. Therefore, to describe the equilibrium 
conditions a simultaneous substitution is needed. Again, 
it is assumed that the neither duopolist has prior 
knowledge on how the other state will react and will 
naively assume that no action will be taken by the other 
state.
Equilibrium
Montana
0 * f'P.T +
a - b*P„ ¥ c*{l + - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - )*P„
t.. • ---------------------------------
{2*b.P„)
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♦ c*P„ } + c*(a * * M' P„ ) + P't#,"'P at
2'#
e.|i 2.p.(a - b * P „  » c P „ )  f c ( «  * P-P.t^ P'P 
t..**f.t(2‘‘> I---------------------------------
2>fi 2-fi
4'b«# • c«; 2'#'(a • b«P *■ c*{« - ;«P
é  ......  B   ■■III...a ,   ■III.   ■II—  !■   ■nil. ■mil.............
2*jJ 2.#
2*|.(a - b'P„ ♦ C'P„) * c*(a - p P'P.^
V "  -------------------------------
W y o m i n g
a - b.p„ + c.(in,/).p„
« * #'P,T * J«'( 1 * - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - )'P.|
2*b*P,... =1
2'f.p»T
2*b*(a - JI*P„ ♦ P'P „ ) ♦ M'(a - b'l, * c * P „ )  + p'C+t',, 
t./*2.̂ .P„ . ---------------------------------------
2<b
P'C 2*b{a - #'P„* p«P„) ♦ fi*(a - b'P,,f c«P,^ 
V'P,T'(2.f ' —  ) '2'b 2'b
4'b'f - p'C 2*b*(o • ? ’P|i * P' P„ ) ♦ ji*(a ■ b * P „ +  c*P
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2*b 2'b
2*b«(< - # P,, + f'PgJ ♦ R'fa - l>*P.t+ e*P,̂
V “ --------------------------------------
Now that equilibrium conditions have been identified, 
the naive assumption that the states do not anticipate 
their competitors actions is relaxed. The two models 
presented below show the tax leadership equilibriums that 
would be achieved for Montana and Wyoming. The first set 
of equations describes the Montana tax leadership model. 
This is followed by a scenario where Wyoming is the tax 
leader. The approach is the same as described for the 
Bertrand price leadership model. The tax leader has full 
knowledge of the followers reaction function and the 
follower continues to assume the leader will not react.
Montana Tax Leadership
Optimal Montana Tax Rate
fl -
T*., ' c.(l + — - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ).p ).p,,
2'f'P„
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M . ,  • V  .a-l, - + t „ * c . p „ . p „  + t „ .c . p „ . (a  - # ' ? , , +  P'P., + P
2'P
dTR„ - C'#'L'P«T * ®*P‘Pit* * 2't,fC'|i'P • a * P„  - b.P„i - 2.t,fb.p + c . p „ . p , ^ t - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - »
dt., 2.#
*c*p*P„* (2'#{a - b * P „ t  C'P + C'(a - P ' P , f +  ji*P,|)*P „
t.i"2'b'P.,2 - -
P 2'#
* C'P'I |2*p(a - b'Pg, + C ' P „  } + c<(fl - P ' P „  + P*P«)l*P «t
t.,' *
P 2*p
2«P*U * b'P„ * C*P|il ♦ C*{« - P*PiT+ P'P mJ 
2'P„*(2*b*p - C'p)
The equilibrium tax rate for the tax follower^ Wyoming, 
is derived by substituting the optimal tax rate for 
Montana into the Wyoming reaction function.
Optimal Wyoming Tax Rate
t., • 2*p«PIT
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2*(l*(a - b-P„ f c*P„) f c*(o - p*P„+ P'P J
« ‘ f'P.T + P'(l+------------------------------- l’P.t
2*P,,*(2*b*P - C'p)
2'#.PIT
2*(2*b<fl - c*p|«(i - f P„ *• P*P„) ♦ p*{2*|»{a - b'P,,* c P „} ♦ c»{« - # P„ ♦ #'P„)) 
" ------------------------------------------------------------
The equations below depict a scenario where Wyoming is 
the tax leader and Montana is the follower. Again, the 
same approach is used to identify optimal tax strategies.
Tax Leadership Wyoming
Optimal Wyoming Tax Rate
TR„» * ̂ (Uy*P„* P'd ♦ t„).P„).P„
a - b . P „  * c.(l + t „ ) . P „
?*,T ' P ' d  ♦ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - I'P., I - P „2.b.P„
- *>*P.t+ C'P ,T+W,T ' V-S.T - t.,-̂ P„* - t f t --------------------- ----
2'b
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+ M'C.P,/ ♦ 2't,.C|i-P *„
 «aP„ * f'P.T* - 2'%.p.P,/ + P-P.»*P»T+----------------------------------
dt., 2'b
2't,y'A'P,T^ * t,;«'P'P \ r  * (2*li*(a - p * P „  + P'P.J <■ P'(a - b * P „  + c*P«y))*P,T
2*b
''»y*P*iT*^2*R*b - C'p) * {2'b'(o - # ' P „ +  P ' P , ^  + p*{a - b * P „  ♦ C'P,))«P #T
2'b
2*b'(* - #'P„ + p*P„) + P'(a - b'P„+ C'P,J
t.,'  -------------------------------2*P-r»(2*|»b - C'pl
The equilibrium tax rate for the tax follower, Montana, 
is derived by substituting the optimal Wyoming tax 
strategy into the Montana reaction function.
Optimal Montana Tax Rate
t., •
2.b.P„
2*b«(o - (l'P,y ♦ p 'P„ ) t p'(a - b*^j + c*P »T'
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â - b * P „  f C'(l*- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ) * P „
■ 2'P,, '(2'f'b - C'|i)
2'b'P
2«(2*f«b - c«p)*(a - b*P„ ♦ C'P„I + e«(2*b*(a - # + p*P„) ♦ p*{a - b*P„ ♦ c*P,y ))
4»b«P_,*(2*p»b - c*p)
This concludes the development of the Montana-Wyoming 
tax duopoly model. The optimal tax strategies identified 
in this chapter, both equilibrium and tax leadership 
scenarios, are used to identify optimal tax rates in 
Chapter 4.
SPATIAL MARKET MODEL
In order to estimate optimal tax rates, a spatial market 
model is used to forecasts 1990 coal demand. These demand 
forecasts are then use in a regression analysis to specify 
Montana and Wyoming coal demand functions. The parameters 
are then substituted into the optimal tax strategies 
developed above. The remaining portion of this chapter 
describes the central core of the spatial market model. A
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full description of the spatial market model is provided 
in the appendices.
The spatial market model is used to distribute the 
forecasted demand for new coal production among the 
competing coal supply centers. These competing supply 
centers are located in Colorado, Illinois, New Mexico, 
Texas, Washington, Utah, South West Wyoming, Montana, and 
Eastern Wyoming. While this study is focused on the 
competition between Montana and Wyoming coal production, 
the other six supply centers must be accounted for so that 
completely bounded spacial markets can be generated. This 
is an important point, because there is a basic assumption 
made in the modeling that the producers in these other 
states will not react to price changes of Montana and 
Wyoming coal supplies.
The spacial market model calculates market boundaries 
between each of the competing coal supply centers. These 
boundaries are defined by points where the cost of using 
coal from one supply center equals the costs of using coal 
from the competing supply center. A simplistic model of 
the coal boundaries, described in Campbell and Hwang 
(1978), is shown by the following equilibrium 
relationship:
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(1) M, + T. D, - M , +  T, D,
(2) D, - (M, - M.)/T, + T, D/T,
(3) D, - k + h D ̂
Where
M, ■ the cost of using coal from supply center A;
M, « the cost of using coal from supply center B;
D, « the distance from supply center A to the market
boundary;
D; ■ the distance from supply center B to the market
boundary; 
k . (M, - MJ/T,;
h « Tj, / T g;
T - variable cost of transportation.
By identifying the distance between the two competing 
coal supply centers, a spacial constraint to the market is 
applied. A market boundary can then be generated using 
the Euclidian distance function. Equation 3 then becomes :
(4) (h-x)^ + y ' - k '  + 2 h k  (x^yM' + h* (x* + y^)
Where h * distance between competing centers ; and 
y and x are rectangular coordinates.
Figure 5 shows this relationship. However, the model 
described by Campbell and Hwang (1978) did not take into 
account other costs associated with using coal from the 
various supply centers. While the distance relationship 
remains the center of the spacial market model, all costs 
must be accounted for before the market boundaries can be
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defined. The variables used to describe this relationship 
are presented in Table 5. The values for these variables, 
used for the forecasts are presented in Appendix A.
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Figure 5. Rectangular Coordinate System for Spatial 
Market Analysis.
y
(0,0) (H.O)
R e c l c n g u l o r  C o o r d i n c i e  S y s i e m  f o r  S p a t i a l  M a r k e t  A n a l y s i s .
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Once the market boundaries are identified, the spatial
market model must determine the level of coal demand
within the spatial market area. This is a fairly straight 
foreword process of summing the coal demand for each state 
in the market area. The inter-fuel substitution algorithm 
provides these estimates of state coal demand. However, 
when a state is bisected by a market boundary, the state­
wide total must also be divided. To do this, SHSA 
locations and populations are identified (U.S. Department 
of Commerce 1979). The population of the SMSAs captured 
within the market boundaries are summed. The sum is
divided by the total state SHSA population. This ratio is 
then used to weight the total state coal demand and 
determine the proportion of the statewide coal demand
captured with in the spatial market.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
57
Table S. Variable Description*.
Line Coal Supply Description 
# Center^
1 A & B Power Plant Size (net MW)
2 A & B Hours Operated at Full Load (hours)
3 A Power Plant Heat Rate (Btu/KWH)
4 A Coal Heat Content (Btu/lb)
5 B Power Plant Heat Rate (Btu/KWH)
6 B Coal Heat Content (Btu/lb)
7 A Power Plant Capital Cost ($/KW)
8 B Power Plant Capital Cost ($/KW)
9 A & B Fixed Charge Rate (decimal)
10 A Operating and Maintenance Costs (S/KWH)
11 B Operating and Maintenance Costs ($/KWH)
12 A FOB Mine Price ($/ton)
13 B FOB Mine Price ($/ton)
14 A Fixed Transportation Cost ($/ton)
15 B Fixed Transportation Cost ($/ton)
16 A Variable Transportation Costs
($/ton-air mile)
17 B Variable Transportation Costs
($/ton-air mile)
18 A & B Straight Line Distance Between A & B
(miles)
• Source : Duffield and others (1985, III-8).
A ■ Either the Montana or Wyoming Supply Center; B - The 
market competitor of A; one of seven possible coal supply 
centers.
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EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
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In this chapter, optimal severance tax rates are 
estimated using the duopoly model developed in the 
previous chapter and coal demand forecasts generated by 
the spatial market model. The concept is relatively
straight forward. The spatial market model is used to 
forecast coal production for severance tax rates ranging 
from 0 to 120 percent in each state. As in Kolstad and 
Wolak's 1983 analysis, the production forecasts provide 
the base data upon which Montana and Wyoming demand 
equations are estimated. This is done by regressing the 
production forecasts on the corresponding prices of 
Montana and Wyoming coal. The regression estimates are 
then substituted into the tax strategies developed in the 
previous chapter and optimal severance tax rates are 
calculated.
Table 6 and 7 present Montana and Wyoming coal
production forecasts. In each table, Wyoming coal
severance tax rates increase as you move to the right and 
are listed across the top. Montana coal severance tax
rates increase as you move down the table and are listed 
along the left side. It is important to note that this is 
"new" coal production and does not include coal production 
that is currently under contract. There is insufficient 
data, specifically concerning Wyoming coal contracts, to
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conduct an in depth analysis which includes current 
production contracts.
These tables reflect the effect of the severance tax 
rate on the demand for each states coal. As expected, the 
demand for Montana and Wyoming coal decreases as the 
severance tax for that state is increased. The converse, 
where demand increases when the tax for the other states 
coal increases, is strongly reflected in the Montana 
forecasts but is almost absent in the Wyoming forecasts.
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Table 6. New Montana Coal Production in 1990.
WT Tax 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120
(Millions of Tons )
HT 0 12 12 13 13 13 13 14 16 18 18 18 18 18
Tax 10 12 12 12 13 13 13 13 13 14 18 18 18 18
20 11 12 12 12 13 13 13 13 13 14 18 18 18
30 11 11 11 11 12 13 12 12 12 12 14 14 14
40 10 11 11 11 11 12 11 12 12 12 12 12 12
50 8 9 9 9 9 11 9 10 10 10 10 10 10
60 3 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 10 10 10 10 10
70 3 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 10 10 10 10
80 2 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
90 2 6 6 6 6 9 6 6 6 6 6 6 6
100 2 2 2 2 2 6 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
110 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
120 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Table 7. New Wyoming Coal Production in 1990.
WY Tax 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120
(Millions of Tons )
HT 0 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 16 6 8 5 10 9
Tax 10 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 17 7 12 9 5 4
20 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 17 7 12 10 9 5
30 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 17 7 12 10 10 8
40 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 17 7 12 10 10 9
50 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 17 7 12 10 10 9
60 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 17 7 12 10 10 9
70 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 17 7 12 10 10 9
80 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 17 7 12 10 10 9
90 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 17 7 12 10 10 9
100 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 17 7 12 10 10 9
110 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 17 7 12 10 10 9
120 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 17 7 12 10 10 9
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Contained in tables 6 and 7 are 169 (13*13) coal
production forecasts for each state. These forecasts are 
used in the regression analysis to estimate the linear 
demand functions listed below. Coal demand is the 
dependant variable and the Montana and Wyoming tax rates 
are the independent variables. The contract sales price 
for each state is used for price variables P,, and P,̂  in 
the equations shown below.
REGRESSION ESTIMATES
Demand Equations
D„ = a - b*(l-»-t„)*P„ + c*(l+t,,)*P„
- Of - f ) *P,y + ^.(l+t„)*P„
OLS Estimates
D„ - 23.38 - 1. 55* (l + t,, ) *7. 47 + 0.46* (l + t,y) *5.37
(1.58) (0.04) (0.06) R'-0.89
SE SE SE
D„ - 28.13 - 1.61* (1+t,,) *5.37 + 0.08* (1+t.,) *7.47
(2.12) (0.08) (0.06) R: -0.70
SE SE SE
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OPTIMAL TAX RATES
The next step in the analysis is to use the coal demand 
forecasts and the tax strategies to compute optimal tax 
rates. Optimal tax rates are calculated using the 
regression estimates listed in the demand equations above. 
This is done by substituting the regression estimates into 
the optimal tax strategies derived in Chapter 4. Optimal 
tax rates are calculated for equilibrium and tax 
leadership scenarios.
Equilibrium Conditions
Optimal Tax Strategies
2.^ .(a - b*P,j + c « P „ )  + c*(« -
2*b*(a - t f'P,̂  I * |(*(4 - b'tt * C'P„)
P,j*(4‘b*p - H'C)
Optimal Tax Rates
2*1.61*(23.38 - 1.55*7.47 t «.46*5.37) ♦ «.46*(28.13 - 1.61*5.37 + «.«8*7.47)
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t„‘. -----------------------------------------------------
7.47.(4*1.55*1.61 - 0.46*0.08)
t,/. .74
V '
2*1.55.(28.13 - 1.61*5.37 + 0.08*7.47) + 0.08*(23.38 - 1.55.7.47 + 0.46*5.37)
5.37.(4*1.55*1.61 - 0.08*0.46)
t,/ « 1.19
The optimum tax rates identified above are based on the 
naive assumption that each producer will not react to a 
change in the other states severance tax rate. This 
assumption is now relaxed and optimal tax rates for two 
price leadership scenarios are presented. First, optimal 
tax rates are identified where Montana is the price 
leader. This is followed by an analysis of optimal tax 
rates where Wyoming is the price leader.
Montana Price Leadership
Optimal Tax Strategies
2*8*(a - b.p^j * c * P „ )  + c*(a - 8*P,^+ „)
t.,‘- -------------------------------
2*P„ • (2*b*jl - c*|i)
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V -
2*{2*b*|l - C'p)'(e - f R'Pg,) + - b * P „ *  c*P + c*|« - ^ * P „  + # ' P , J )
Optimal Tax Rates
2.1.61.(23.3$ - 1.55.7.47 + 4.46.5.37) + 0.46.(28.13 - 1.61.5.37 * 0.08.7.47)
t..* ' 2.7.47.(2.1.55.1,61 - 0.46.0.
t„* . 1.19
2. (2.1.55.1.61-0.46.0.08).(28.13-1.61.5.37+0.08.7.47)+0.08.(2.1.61.(23.38-1.55.7.47 
+0.46.5.37)+0.46.(28.13-1.61.5.37+0.08.7.47))
4.1,61.5.37.(2.1.55.1.61 - 0.46.0.<
Wyoming Tax Leadership
Optimal Tax Strategies
2.b*(o - #.P,f + p . P g J  + #.(a - b ' P „ +  c . p , ^
V "  -------------------------------
t-.* '
2.P-..{2.|«b - c.|i)
2.(2.0.b - c.;).(a - b . P „  + c . p „ )  + c.(2.b*(e - + p . P „ )  + p.(a - b . p „  + c . p „ ) )
4.b.p,,.(2.0.b - c.p)
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Optimal Tax Rates
2-1.55*(28.13 - 1.61.5.37 + 0.88.7.47) f 0.08.(23.38 - 1.55.7.47 + 0.46.5.37)
2.5.37.(2.1.61.1.55 - 0.46.0.1
t,/ . 1.19
2.(2.1.61.1.55+0.46.0.08).(23.38-1.55.7.47+0.46.S.37)f0.46.(2.1.55.(28.13-1.61.5.37 
+0.08.7.47)+0.08.(23.38-1.55.7.47+0.46.5.37))
4.1.55.7.47.(2.1.61*1.55-0.46.0.08)
Table 8 summarizes the optimal tax rates calculated 
above.
Table 8. Optimal Tax Rates.
Equilibrium
Montana Price Leadership 
Wyoming Price Leadership
Montana Wyoming
74 % 119 %
75 % 119 %
74 % 119 %
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Matrix Analysis
A simple matrix analysis is presented as a cross-check 
to the regression analysis. The coal production forecasts 
presented in tables 6 and 7 can easily be converted to 
state tax revenue forecasts by multiplying the production 
level by the corresponding price and severance tax rate. 
Table 9 presents the corresponding prices and tax rates 
for both states. Tables 10 and 11 present the resulting 
tax revenue forecasts. Optimal severance tax rates can be 
identified by inspection, as discussed below.
Table 9. Price and Tax Rates.
Tax Montana Wyoming
Rate FOB FOB
0 7.47 5. 37
10 8. 22 5.91
20 8. 96 6. 44
30 9. 71 6. 98
40 10. 46 7. 52
50 11. 21 8.06
60 11. 95 8. 59
70 12.70 9. 13
80 13. 45 9. 67
90 14. 19 10. 20
100 14. 94 10. 74
110 15. 96 11. 27
120 16. 43 11.81
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Table 1C. Montana Tax Revenue Forecasts.
(New Coal Production)
n Tax {\) 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120
(million $)
NT 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Tax 10 9.00 9.00 9.00 9.75 9.75 9.75 9.75 9.75 10.50 13.50 13.50 13.50 13.50
(1) 20 16.39 17.88 17.88 17.88 19.37 19.37 19.37 19.37 19.37 20.86 26.82 26.82 26.82
30 24.64 24.64 24.64 24.64 26.88 29.12 26.88 26.88 26.88 26.88 31.36 31.36 31.36
40 29.90 32.89 32.89 32.89 32.89 35.88 32.89 35.88 35.88 35.88 35.88 35.88 35.88
50 29.92 33.66 33.66 33.66 33.66 41.14 33.66 37.40 37.40 37.40 37.40 37.40 37.40
40 13.44 40.32 40.32 40.32 40.32 40.32 40.32 40.32 44.80 44.80 44.80 44.80 44.80
70 15.69 47.07 47.07 47.07 47.07 47.07 47.07 47.07 47.07 52.30 52.30 52.30 52.30
80 11.96 53.82 53.82 53.82 53.82 53.82 53.82 53.82 53.82 53.82 53.82 53.82 53.82
90 13.44 40.32 40.32 40.32 40.32 60.48 40.32 40.32 40.32 40.32 40.32 40.32 40.32
100 14.94 14.94 14.94 14.94 14.94 44.82 14.94 14.94 14.94 14.94 14.94 14.94 14.94
110 16.98 16.98 16.98 16.98 16.98 16.98 16.98 16.98 16.98 16.98 16.98 16.98 16.98
120 17.92 17.92 17.92 17.92 17.92 17.92 17.92 17.92 17.92 17.92 17.92 17.92 17.92
Table 11. Wyoming Tax Revenue Forecasts, 
(lev Coal Production)
IT Tax (11 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 
(million $)
70 80 90 100 110 120
NT 0 0.00 9.72 19.26 28.98 38.70 48.42 57.96 60.16 68.80 38.64 26.85 59.00 57.96
Tax 10 0.00 9.72 19.26 28.98 38.70 48.42 57.96 63.92 73.10 57.96 48.33 29.50 25.76
(1) 20 0.00 9.72 19.26 28.98 38.70 48.42 57.96 63.92 73.10 57.96 53.70 53.10 32.2030 0.00 9.72 19.26 28.98 38.70 48.42 57.96 63.92 73.10 57.96 53.70 59.00 51.52
40 0.00 9.72 19.26 28.98 38.70 48.42 57.96 63.92 73.10 57.96 53.70 59.00 57.96
50 0.00 9.72 19.26 28.98 38.70 48.42 57.96 63.92 73.10 57.96 53.70 59.00 57.96
60 0.00 9.72 19.26 28.98 38.70 48.42 57.96 63.92 73.10 57.96 53.70 59.00 57.96
70 0.00 9.72 19.26 28.98 38.70 48.42 57.96 63.92 73.10 57.96 53.70 59.00 57.96
80 0.00 9.72 19.26 28.98 38.70 48.42 57.96 63.92 73.10 57.96 53.70 59.00 57.96
90 0.00 9.72 19.26 28.98 38.70 48.42 57.96 63.92 73.10 57.96 53.70 59.00 57.96
100 0.00 9.72 19.26 28.98 38.70 48.42 57.96 63.92 73.10 57.96 53.70 59.00 57.96
110 0.00 9.72 19.26 28.98 38.70 48.42 57.96 63.92 73.10 57.96 53.70 59.00 57.96
120 0.00 9.72 19.26 28.98 38.70 48.42 57.96 63.92 73.10 57.96 53.70 59.00 57.96
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
69
In Table 10, Montana tax revenues are maximized at a 
rate of 80 percent for all columns except where the 
Wyoming tax rate is zero. In Table 11, Wyoming tax 
revenues are maximized at a rate of 80 percent in every 
column. This would suggest that Wyoming, if it were 
trying to maximize coal severance tax revenues, would set 
the tax rate at 80 percent. Montana in response would 
also set the tax rate at 80 percent.
The optimal Montana severance tax rate shown in Table 10 
compares favorably with the duopoly model results 
discussed above. However, the 80 percent rate for Wyoming 
differs by 40 percentage points when compared to the 
duopoly model results. This suggests that the regression 
analysis may be over estimating the optimal severance tax 
rate.
The matrix analysis provides a rather simple solution in 
this case. However, this is not always the case. If the 
combinations were arranged in a more complex fashion, the 
solution could not be identified by inspection but would 
require the development of optimal solutions using matrix 
analysis techniques. Further, the imposition of the 
duopoly model provides a method to analyze both the 
equilibrium and leadership scenarios.
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Thus fary this thesis has provided a literature review, 
developed a theoretical model to analyze Montana and 
Wyoming coal tax policies, and provided estimates of 
optimal severance tax rates. The analysis now becomes one 
of interpretation. Built into the Montana-Wyoming coal 
severance tax duopoly model and the spatial market model 
are a number of assumptions. These assumptions simplify 
the issues surrounding Montana and Wyoming severance tax 
policies and focuses the discussion on how changes in the 
severance tax rate impact coal tax revenues. In reality, 
the issues are not simple.
The impact of the major assumptions on the results will 
be discussed in this chapter. Further, the results of 
Kolstad and Wolak (1983), Ward (1982), and Zimmerman and 
Alt (1981) are compared to the optimal rates derived in 
this thesis. At the end of this chapter, a discussion of 
the major conclusions that can be reached from this 
analysis is presented.
REVIEW OF ASSUMPTIONS
The assumption that each state wants to maximize 
severance tax revenues underlies the entire analysis.
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Clearly, this is a considerable simplification of reality. 
The fact that both Montana and Wyoming have recently 
reduced severance tax rates suggests that other 
considerations are more important to policy makers. On 
the other hand, the analysis presented in this thesis is 
still important. Often the discussion of setting
severance tax rates is clouded by contradicting reports 
from proponents and opponents of higher severance tax 
rates. An objective economic study should provide a basis 
upon which policy makers can gauge the impact of other 
considerations such as overall tax revenues, employment, 
the health of the coal industry, and energy policy, among 
others.
Another important point that must be recognized is that 
the analysis is based on the change in demand for "new" 
production not total production. As discussed in the 
previous chapter, existing coal contracts are not analyzed 
because of insufficient data on current contracts. To the 
extent that coal production under existing contracts 
changes because of changes in the severance tax rate, 
optimal rates may change. However, the consistency of the 
optimal rates calculated in this thesis, as compared to 
other analyses of optimal coal tax rates, suggests that 
using the growth in Montana and Wyoming coal demand does
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provide accurate results (see "COMPARISON WITH OTHER
STUDIES", below).
The use of linear demand curves also influences the 
results of the model. Because of the concentration of 
coal fired generation plants in given geographical areas, 
such as the Minneapolis area, the demand function may
actually have breaks where, if the tax rate exceeds a 
certain rate, demand falls dramatically. Figure 6 shows a 
graph of one column of data presented in Table 6. This 
column of data reflects the change in demand if Wyoming 
were to hold their severance tax rate at 10 percent. 
Notice the breaks between 40 and 50 percent, 80 and 90 
percent, and 90 and 100 percent. Once the rate exceeds 90 
percent, the only remaining increase in demand for Montana
coal is by the coal generation facilities located in
Montana.
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Figure 6. Montana Coal Demand When Wyoming Severance Tax 
is 10 percent.
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Severance tax revenues are not the only tax revenues the 
state receives from the coal industry. Both Montana and 
Wyoming have income taxes and coal company employees pay a 
portion of these taxes. Raising the severance tax rate 
will increase severance tax revenues up to the optimum. 
However, if coal workers are laid off because of declining 
coal production, income tax revenues will fall. If the 
goal is to maximize overall state tax revenues, the 
optimum severance tax rate will probably be smaller due to 
declining income tax collections at high severance tax 
rates. However, the importance of this factor should be 
relatively small given the few number of coal workers that 
are employed in the industry. Zimmerman and Alt (1981, 
17} did analyze wage income and the associated taxes and 
found that the optimal rate of 62.5 percent for each state 
was not sensitive to wage income.
Another simplifying assumption is that all other coal 
producing states and the railroad companies would not 
react to changes in Montana and Wyoming coal severance tax 
policies. To the extent that other coal producing states 
would react by changing their own tax rates, optimal 
Montana and Wyoming severance tax rates would be reduced.
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The railroads may have the strongest market power of all 
of the potential market participants. In Montana there is 
only one carrier, BN. In Wyoming, there are two. These 
railroad companies are regulated and, to the extent that 
this is effective in controlling cartel actions, 
regulations would limit the exercise of market power. 
However, Zimmerman and Alt (1981, 20) did analyze the
economic rents that these railroads extract and state that 
"when considered in terms of what the railroads have been 
doing, a 62.5% (severance) tax in not high."
It is also implicitly assumed that the total increase in 
severance taxes is passed on to the electric companies. 
This would not be the case. With constricting markets, 
some portion of the tax increase would be taken up by the 
producers and the rail companies in order to maintain 
market share. These actions would tend to push the 
optimal rate higher because the consumers of Montana coal 
would not feel the full impact of tax increase.
The marginal cost of producing coal is assumed to be 
constant. Because of economies of scale, reduced
production would tend to drive up variable costs. This 
would mean that production may fall off faster than 
otherwise. On the other hand, strip mine operations are
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very capital Intensive requiring large and expensive 
equipment. These costs are largely fixed costs and would 
tend to outweigh the effect of rising variable costs.
The above discussion is presented in order to provide 
some perspective concerning the accuracy of the optimal 
tax estimates. A comparison of the results Montana coal 
duopoly model and the three other reports that are the 
subject of Chapter 2 is presented below. At the end of 
this chapterf the general conclusions that can be reached 
are stated.
COMPARISON WITH OTHER STUDIES
Table 12 shows the optimal tax rates developed in this 
chapter and the optimal rates calculated by Kolstad and 
Wolak (1983), Ward (1982), and Zimmerman and Alt (1981). 
Because the analysis presented in this thesis most closely 
followed the Kolstad and Wolak methodology there are 
comparable rates for all four categories listed. The 
fourth category. Simple Cartel Rate, needs some 
explanation. The Chapter 4 result listed for the Simple 
Cartel Rate category is taken from the matrix analysis 
presented at the end of that chapter. This number was
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chosen because it is more comparable to the methods used 
to identify optimal rates in Ward (1981) and Zimmerman and 
Alt (1981). As stated in Chapter 2, Ward (1981) and 
Zimmerman and Alt (1981) did not develop a duopoly model 
to identify optimal rates. These reports approached the 
problem by estimating potential tax revenues under a 
number of different severance tax scenarios and 
identifying the scenario returning the highest revenue. 
The simple matrix analysis presented at the end of Chapter 
4 takes this same approach.
Kolstad and Wolak (1983) do not present an optimal tax 
rate calculated in this manner. Instead, they present a 
"collusion" scenario where the optimal tax rate maximizes 
the combined severance tax revenues of Montana and 
Wyoming. This is the number shown in the Simple Cartel 
Rate category for Kolstad and Wolak (1983).
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Table 12. Comparison of Optimal Severance Tax Rates
Duopoly
issuiptioD
Chapter 4 
Results
Kolstad aod 
Holak (1983)
Ward
(1982)
liiieriao 
aod àlt 
(1981)
Equilibrium 
Nootaoa 74 %
Ryomiog 119
Nootaoa Leadership 
Nootaoa 75
Nyoiiog 119
Vyoiiog Leadership 
Nootaoa 74
Nyoiiog 119
Simple Cartel Rate 
Both States 80
27
33
35
35
35
35
87 70 62.5
CONCLUSIONS
The optimal coal rates identified in this thesis and the 
other studies suggest that either state would maximize 
revenues at much higher rates than are currently charged. 
The rates that are calculated for Montana and Wyoming are 
stable and do not vary significantly with any of the 
duopoly model assumptions. The simple matrix approach 
does differ from the results using the more sophisticated 
duopoly model approach. This may suggest that for the 
Wyoming optimal tax rate the duopoly model is
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overestimating the rate. This may reflect the use of a 
linear demand curve.
Even if rates as high as 74 percent in Montana and 119 
percent in Wyoming are never adopted, it is clear that 
increasing severance tax rates from current levels will 
result in increasing severance tax revenues and cutting
the severance tax rates in Montana and Wyoming will lead 
to tax revenue reductions. This can be seen more clearly 
by inspecting figures 7 and 8.
Figures 7 and 8 show Montana and Wyoming tax revenues 
for a range of severance tax rates. These figures are 
simply a graphical representation of the tax revenue
functions and empirical data presented in Chapter 4. 
Moving left to right along the x-axis of Figure 7, the
Montana severance tax rate increases from 0 to 150 
percent. The family of curves represent Montana severance 
tax revenues for six different Wyoming severance tax rates 
(0, 25, 50, 75, 100, and 125 percent). Moving left to
right along the x-axis of Figure 8, the Wyoming severance 
tax rate increases from 0 to 200 percent. The family of 
curves represent Wyoming fseverance tax revenues for six
different Montana severance tax rates (0, 25, 50, 75, 100, 
and 125 percent).
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Figure 8. Wyoming Tax Revenues
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If coal production and the health of the coal industry 
is considered, then the relatively high optimal severance 
tax rates would be of concern. At the optimal rates, 
Montana would lose 3 to 6 tons of forecasted new 
production and Wyoming would lose 9 tons, compared to 
forecasted production levels at current severance tax 
rates. These are significant declines in the amount of 
new coal demand that producers in Montana and Wyoming 
would lose.
Another consideration that must be taken into account is 
that as the severance tax rises and demand for NGP coal is 
reduced, a larger and larger share of the severance tax is 
paid by electric consumers in Montana and Wyoming. This 
is another factor that would that would put downward 
pressure on optimal severance tax rates. However,
Zimmerman and Alt (1981) found that even at high rates, 
out of state energy consumers still pay most of the tax. 
This is because a large portion of the electricity 
produced by coal fired generation in Montana and Wyoming 
is exported to other western states.
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APPENDIX A
SPATIAL MARKET MODEL
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The demand for Montana and Wyoming coal is a derived 
demand generated by the demand for electricity. 
Approximately ninety-five percent of the coal sold from 
Montana and Wyoming is used to generate electricity (DOE 
1988a, 20). In the energy market, Montana and Wyoming
Powder River coal producers compete against the coal 
producing regions of Colorado, Illinois, New Mexico, 
Washington, Texas, Utah, and South West Wyoming (Duffield 
and others 1982). Coal also competes with alternative 
fuels and power sources including nuclear, hydroelectric, 
oil, and natural gas.
Coal demand forecasts are made by forecasting future 
electric demand, calculating the portion of this demand 
supplied by coal, and estimating the share of this market 
supplied by Montana and Wyoming. The electric demand 
forecasting model is used to predict 1990 energy demand 
for each state in the potential NGP market area. A 
constant, annual electric growth rate of two percent is 
assumed.
An inter-fuel substitution algorithm is used to identify 
the proportion of this forecasted electric demand which 
will be supplied by coal. The approach is relatively 
simple. Forecasts of nuclear, hydroelectric, gas, and oil
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generated electricity are subtracted from the forecasted 
demand for electricity. Then the amount of electricity 
currently generated by coal-fired plants is subtracted. 
The residual represents the portion of electric demand 
forecasted to be supplied by new coal-fired generation. 
This forecast of the demand for new coal-fired generation 
(GWh) for each state is then converted to a demand for 
coal, in tons.
Nine competing coal supply regions are identified in the 
spatial market model : Illinois, New Mexico, southwest
Wyoming, Colorado, Texas, Utah, Washington, Montana, and 
Eastern Wyoming. Geographical market boundaries between 
competing coal supply regions are calculated. When all 
nine supply centers are used, fully bounded spatial 
markets can be identified for both Montana and Wyoming. 
Within these market areas, coal from the producing state 
is the least cost source fuel for coal-fired generation 
plants. The end result is a forecast of new coal demand 
for Montana and Wyoming Powder River coal. (Appendix B 
contains a description of all of the computer programs 
needed to make the coal demand forecasts. Appendix C 
provides a line listing of the Fortran program 
"NEWHYP.FOR". This program calculates the spacial market 
boundaries.)
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ELECTRIC DEMAND FORECASTS
A forecast of 1990 electric demand is made for each 
state in the potential NGP coal market, based on a two 
percent constant annual electric growth rate (see Table 
15). The two percent growth rate corresponds to the 
"median" forecast used in Montana Coal Market to the Year 
2000: Impact of Severance Tax. Air Pollution Control and
Reclamation Costs (Duffield and others 1985). As it turns 
out, a two percent electric growth rate is also supported 
by current trends. Energy demand increased by an average 
annual rate of 2.02 percent between 1983 and 1987. Tables 
13 and 14 present actual electric generation for these two 
years.
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Table 13. Net Electric Energy Generation in 1983^ by 
Source.*
State All Fuel Coal Nuclear Hydro 
(Gigawatt-hours)
Petroleum Gas 
(Fired (Fired 
Steam) Steam)
Iowa 22,253 18,734 2,309 918 47 161
Kansas 23,773 19,592 0 6 198 3,410
Minnesota 29,971 17,054 11,753 929 24 180
Montana 15,097 3,452 0 11,561 10 32
Nebraska 17,052 9,471 6,082 1,346 33 77
North Dakota 19,601 17,182 0 2,377 42 0
Oklahoma 45,711 19,575 0 2,500 13 22,616
South Dakota 7,779 2,274 0 5,494 5 1
Wisconsin 39,348 27393 9299 2298 93 133
Arkansas 30,073 16,042 7,646 3,315 46 3,016
Colorado 25,225 22,243 748 1,870 54 291
Idaho 12,772 0 0 12,771 0 0
Illinois 99,160 66,908 28,021 117 3,095 736
Michigan 70,911 52,016 16,383 1,113 639 618
Missouri 52,705 50,596 0 1,716 118 138
Wyoming 26,258 25,054 0 1,150 41 12
Louisiana 37,042 8,378 0 0 352 28,295
Oregon 49,180 443 3,685 45,049 8 0
Texas 206,214 87,488 0 1,107 1,964 111,905
Washington 95,099 6,111 3,494 85,435 9 0
Indiana 70,863 70,004 0 418 177 224
996,087 540,010 89,420 181,490 6,968 171,845
* Source: DOE 1984b
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Table 14. Net Electric Energy Generation in 1987, by 
Source. •
State All Fuel Coal Nuclear Hydro
(Gigawatt-hours)
Petroleum Gas 
(Fired (Fired 
Steam) Steam)
Iowa 25,549 21,704 2,523 970 39 194
Kansas 30,822 23,075 6,471 48 948
Minnesota 34,406 21,627 11,554 9 26 410
Montana 20,884 11,836 0 720 16 57
Nebraska 20,489 10,153 8,489 8,925 43 117
North Dakota 22,620 20,618 0 1,982 19 0
Oklahoma 42,737 21,089 0 2,948 25 16,199
South Dakota 6,265 905 0 5,354 2 2
Wisconsin 44,030 31032 11311 1319 58 110
Arkansas 36,287 19,373 11,369 2,407 5 3,131
Colorado 28,810 26,192 174 1,818 16 599
Idaho 8,105 0 0 8,105 0 0
Illinois 109,887 57,933 50,194 90 1,445 144
Michigan 87,035 71,135 14,389 364 694 360
Missouri 55,087 47,170 6,284 1,447 71 51
Wyoming 37,370 36,535 0 768 59 9
Louisiana 51,309 15,102 12,324 0 60 23,820
Oregon 39,739 0 4,348 35,431 0 0
Texas 212,620 106,405 0 2,158 540 100,665
Washington 83,756 8,166 5,528 69,698 5 0
Indiana 78,575 77,620 0 507 92
1,076,382 627,670 144,958 145,020 3,171 146,908
• Source : DOE 1988a.
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Table 15. Net Electric Demand in 1983, 1987, and 1990
State Net Electric Generation 
(Gigawatt-hours)
1983' 1987" 1990'
Iowa 22,253 25,549 25,562
Kansas 23,773 30,822 27,308
Minnesota 29,971 34,406 34,427
Montana 15,097 20,884 17,342
Nebraska 17,052 20,489 19,587
North Dakota 19,601 22,620 22,515
Oklahoma 45,711 42,737 52,508
South Dakota 7,779 6,265 8,936
Wisconsin 39,348 44,030 45,198
Arkansas 30,073 36,287 34,544
Colorado 25,225 28,810 28,976
Idaho 12,772 8,105 14,671
Illinois 99,160 109,887 113,904
Michigan 70,911 87,035 81,454
Missouri 52,705 55,087 60,541
Wyoming 26,258 37,370 30,162
Louisiana 37,042 51,309 42,550
Oregon 49,180 39,739 56,492
Texas 206,214 212,620 236,875
Washington 95,099 83,756 109,239
Indiana 70,863 78,575 81,399
996,087 1,076,382 1,144,191
DOE 1984b, 29. 
DOE 1988a, 20. 
Forecasted.
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Sensitivity to Electric Growth Rates
There is no sensitivity analysis of electric rates 
conducted for this study. However, Duffield and Others 
(1982 and 1985) did conduct sensitivity analyses. The 
results of the 1985 analysis are presented below.
In the 1985 study, Duffield and others forecasted coal 
demand using 3 different electric growth rates : 1, 2, and
3 percent. Table 16 shows forecasted Montana coal demand 
(in millions of tons) for five Montana FOB prices and two 
Wyoming FOB prices, and for forecast years 1990, 1995, and 
2000. Table 16 also shows the percent change in coal 
demand associated with each electric growth rate and price 
scenario.
For example, the percentage change in demand when the 
electric growth rate increases form 1 to 2 percent is 5.49 
percent, for the 1990 forecast and a Montana FOB of 
$10.50, and a Wyoming FOB of $6.00. The largest change, 
76.77 percent, occurred between the 1 percent and 2 
percent electric growth rates, for a Montana FOB of $7.50 
and a Wyoming FOB of $7.70 in the year 2000. This 
reflects both greater sensitivity when Montana and Wyoming
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FOB prices are similar and when the forecast period is 
relatively long.
Table 16. Montana Coal Demand for Three Electric Rates*'**. 
Year 1990 1995 2000
Electric
Growth Rate I 1% 2% 3% 1% 2% 3% 1% 2% 3%
A. Wyoming FOB Price 36.00/ton 
Montana FOB
$10.50/ton 36.4 38.4 41.3 38.0 44.2 53.0 44.1 51.0 59.9
%change 5.49% 7.55% 16.32% 19.91% 15.65% 17.45%
S9.50/ton 38.1 41.5 42.9 41.9 46.2 64.6 48.3 62.9 85.2
%change 8.92% 3.37% 10.26% 39.83% 30.23% 35.45%
$8.50/ton 38.9 42.5 44.2 42.8 47.2 72.2 48.3 68.0 96.8
%change 9.25% 4.00% 10.28% 52.97% 40.79% 42.35%
$7.50/ton 42.7 44.7 44.7 45.4 47. 2 72.2 48.3 68.0 100.1
%change 4.68% 0.00% 3.96% 52.97% 40.79% 47.21%
B. Wvominc FOB Price S7.70
Montana FOB
$10.50/ton 37.9 40.8 42.0 41.3 45. 3 64.6 48.3 62.9 81.2
%change 7.65% 2.94% 9.69% 42.60% 30.23% 29.09%
$9.50/ton 38.6 41.8 43.3 42.5 46.3 64.6 48.3 62.9 85.4
%change 8.29% 3.59% 8.94% 39.52% 30.23% 35.77%
$8.50/ton 38.9 42.5 44.2 42.8 47.2 73.0 48.4 68.7 98.4
%change 9.25% 4.00% 10.28% 54.66% 41.94% 43.23%
$7.50/ton 42.7 45.8 47.4 46.6 54.4 94.7 50.8 89.8 140.8
%change 7.26% 3.49% <16.74% 74.08% 76.77% 56.79%
• All demand forecasts are in millions of tons.
" Source: Duffield and others (1985, III-32).
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INTER-FUEL SUBSTITUTION
The Inter-fuel substitution algorithm takes the 
forecasted electric demand and allocates it to competing 
energy sources. Nuclear, hydropower, oil, gas and 
existing coal fired electric generation, for 1983, are 
shown in Table 13 above. Forecast of nuclear, hydropower, 
oil and gas in the year 1990 are based on information 
provided in the 1982 NGP coal demand study (Duffield and 
others 1982), as updated using information from DOE 
(1981b) and U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (1983).
Using the 1990 electric demand forecasts for each state 
in the NGP market area, forecasted generation for nuclear, 
hydropower, oil, gas, and existing coal generation is 
subtracted. The residual represents the demand for new 
coal-fired generation in the year 1990. The forecasted 
new coal-fired generation demand, in kilowatt-hours, is 
converted to demand for coal in tons using a simple 
conversion (see Appendix B).
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SPATIAL MARKET MODEL
The core of the spatial market model is described in
Chapter 3. The description presented in this appendix 
goes further into the detail of the model description. 
The variables listed in Table 17 below provide a complete 
description of the costs of operating a coal fired
generator. The variables and the values used in the
analysis are the subject of the remaining portion of this
appendix.
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Table 17. Variable Descriptions*.
Line Coal Supply Description 
# Center**
1 A & B Power Plant Size <net MW)
2 A & B Hours Operated at Full Load (hours)
3 A Power Plant Heat Rate (Btu/KWH)
4 A Coal Heat Content (Btu/lb)
5 B Power Plant Heat Rate (Btu/KWH)
6 B Coal Heat Content (Btu/lb)
7 A Power Plant Capital Cost ($/KW)
8 B Power Plant Capital Cost ($/KW)
9 A & B Fixed Charge Rate (decimal)
10 A Operating and Maintenance Costs ($/KWH)
11 B Operating and Maintenance Costs ($/KWH)
12 A FOB Mine Price ($/ton)
13 B FOB Mine Price ($/ton)
14 A Fixed Transportation Cost (S/ton)
15 B Fixed Transportation Cost ($/ton)
16 A Variable Transportation Costs
($/ton-air mile)
17 B Variable Transportation Costs
($/ton-air mile)
18 A & B Straight Line Distance Between A & B
(miles)
* Source : Duffield and others (1985, III-18).
* A ■ Either the Montana or Wyoming Supply Center; B « The 
market competitor of A; one of seven possible coal supply 
centers.
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Table IS. Spatial Market Model: Coal Supply Center Data
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Power Plant Size (net MW)
The model plant used for this study is 500 MW in size. 
This was based on the information presented in Projections 
of Coal Demand from the Northern Great Plains Through the 
year 2010 (Duffield and others 1982). Of 443 coal-fired 
utility boilers ordered between 1958 and 1980, the average 
net capacity of was 482 MW per boiler. Furthermore, of 
the 144 boiler orders expected in 1982, the average 
capacity was 511 MW per boiler (Duffield and others 1982).
Capacity Factor
Large coal-fired power plants typically provide base 
load generation. Base load capacity ranges form 50 to 70 
percent (BPRI 1979). A 65 percent load is used in this 
study. This was also the rate used in the 1982 study.
Heat Rate
The heat rate represents the amount of heat, Btu, 
required to generate one kilowatt-hour. The heat rates 
for using coal depend on the quality of the coal used. 
For example, bituminous coal in the west has an average 
heat rate of 9,772. This compares to an average heat rate
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of 10,049 for subbltuninous coal in the same region. The 
heat rates used in this study are based on those presented 
in Projections of Coal Demand from the Northern Great 
Plains through the Year 2010 (Duffield and others 1982) 
and a personal interview with staff members of XCF Inc.
(1984).
Power Plant Capital Costs (PPCC)
The PPCC is based on costs developed in Duf field and 
others (1982). The PPCC without sulfur control costs are 
escalated to 1984 dollars at a real rate of 2.3 percent. 
The sulfur control costs are escalated to 1984 dollars at 
a real rate of 0.5 percent. After multiplying the PPCC 
with out sulfur costs by a capacity penalty, the sulfur 
costs are added in order to get total PPCC. These costs 
are levelized within the model when multiplied by the 
fixed capital recovery factor. In addition to accounting 
for real changes, all inputs are converted to mid-1984 
dollars using the implicit price deflator for GMP.
Fixed Capital Recovery Factor
The fixed capital recovery factor accounts for the costs 
incurred when a coal fired generator is built. These
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costs includet interest, depreciation, taxes (income and 
property), and insurance. A rate of 7.41 percent is used. 
This rate is based on the analysis presented in the 1982 
study. Table 19 provides a listing of the various rates 
included in the recovery factor.
Table 19. Real Levelized Annual Fixed Charge Rate*.
Component Percent
Weighted cost of capital 3.77
Depreciation (sinking fund) 1.85
Insurance and property taxes 2.00
Levelized income tax 1.71
Levelized investment tax credit (1.03)
Levelized accelerated depreciation fO.89)
Total 7.41
• Source: Duffield and others (1982).
Operation and Maintenance Costs
Operation and maintenance (O&M) costs were again based 
on the 1982 coal study. Only variable costs are included 
in this category. The O&M costs were escalated to 1984 
dollars based on a real rate of 1.25 percent. This factor 
does reflect increases in cost associated with using coal 
containing higher concentrations of SO*. No distinction 
was made between Powder River coal produced in Montana 
compared to Wyoming.
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FOB Mine Price
The FOB mine price is the pivotal variable of the 
analysis. Increasing the severance tax rate increases the 
price of coal sold by either Montana or Wyoming. All 
other things being equal, the effect of the severance tax 
rate on the demand for Montana and Wyoming coal can then 
be measured. Contract sale prices are established for 
both Montana and Wyoming. The rates are $7.47 per ton for 
Montana coal and $5.37 per ton for Wyoming and represent 
the FOB price of coal if severance tax rates are set to 
zero. The FOB prices reported in Duffield and others 
(1982) were used for all of the other supply centers. 
These prices were escalated to 1984 dollars based on the 
real escalation rate of 1.25 percent.
By 1984, FOB mine prices had become confidential. 
Therefore, a number of alternative sources were 
investigated to develop an estimate of Montana and Wyoming 
FOB prices. Montana gross proceeds tax forms for 1983 
were used by weighting these proceeds by coal production. 
Proceeds coming from the^ Spring Creek and Decker mines 
were separated because of the relatively high Btu content 
of this coal. Proceeds collected from sales of coal owned
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by Westmoreland, Western Energy, and Peabody coal were 
averaged together. The subbituminous coals produced from 
these mines is similar to the quality of average coal
produced from Wyoming Powder River coals. The Btu content 
per pound range from 8,400 to 8,700 for coal produced at 
these three mines. The FOB price for these coals varied 
from $10.77 to $11.13 and averaged $11.01, per ton.
From this information, a base rate of $9.50 per ton was 
established for Montana coal. However, this rate includes 
the 1984 effective tax rate of 21.3 percent. Therefore, a 
rate of $7.47 per ton was used to reflect the 0 percent 
tax rate scenario.
Price information was more difficult to collect for 
Wyoming coal. Only "value per ton" is reported by the 
Wyoming Department of Revenue. However, individuals in 
the Wyoming Ad Valorem Tax Division were able to supply an 
estimate of average FOB mine price for mines in the Powder
River basin of $9.77 for 1983 (Wyoming Department of
Revenue 1984).
While FOB prices based on state tax proceeds are
excellent for estimating average prices, this average 
includes prices based on contracts that were signed in the
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early seventies. Information published by Coal Network 
Associates (1984) provided the contract information used 
to calcualte current FOB prices. Average FOB price for 
Montana coal (subbituminous coal) averaged about $9.75 per 
ton. In Wyoming the 1983 FOB price's reported by Coal 
Network Associates (1984) averaged $6.25 per ton.
Individuals at the Wyoming Geological Survey were able 
to provide an estimate of Wyoming mine price of $7.70 per 
ton. Reports published in the Wvoming Ouarterlv Update 
(1984) indicated that Omaha Public Power had renegotiated 
a coal supply price with Exxon resulting in a drop in FOB 
mine price at the Caballo and Rawhide mines from $8.25 per 
ton to $5.75.
From this information^ a base rate of $6.00 per ton was 
established for Wyoming coal. Again, the effective 
Wyoming tax rate of 10.5 percent is included in this FOB 
price. The without tax rate would be $5.37.
Once the base rates are established, spacial market 
boundaries are estimated for Montana and Wyoming tax rates 
ranging from 0 percent to 120 percent. Table 20 presents 
Montana and Wyoming tax rates and the associated FOB 
prices.
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Table 20. Montana and Wyoming FOB at Tax Rates Ranging 
from 0 to 120 percent.
Tax Montana Wyoming
Rate FOB FOB
0 7. 47 5. 37
10 8.22 5.91
20 8.96 6.44
30 9.71 6 . 98
40 10. 46 7 . 52
50 11. 21 8.06
60 11. 95 8. 59
70 12 . 70 9. 13
80 13. 45 9.67
90 14. 19 10. 20
100 14 . 94 10. 74
110 15. 96 11.27
120 16. 43 11.81
Fixed and Variable Transportation Costs
For coal shipments out of the Powder River, the dominant 
cost is the transportation cost. This why a spacial 
market model provides an excellent forecasting tool. All 
coal transportation for Powder River coal is assumed to be 
by unit train. The fixed and variable transportation 
costs used in the 1982 coal study (Duf field and others 
1982} used a fixed transportation cost of $1.04/ton and a 
variable transportation cost of $0.0133/ton-mile. In
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order to estimate current rates, a complete set of 
Burlington Northern (BN) time-volume/unit train tariffs as 
of July 1984 was obtained for Wyoming and Montana coal 
shipments (Burlington Norther Railroad 1984). Based on 
regression analysis of 120 observations the following 
linear equation was specified,
TARIFF » 1.77 + 0.0166.MILE
(t-statistic) (2.67) (27.80) R* » .88
The overall R' of 0.88 indicates an excellent fit to the 
data. When "minimum volume” was included as a second 
independent variable, the estimated coefficient was not 
significantly different from zero. This indicates a 
yearly nominal change in real rail tariffs of 9.2 percent 
or, given the change in the implicit price deflator (mid- 
1980 to mid-1984), a 3.4 percent real annual increase. 
This is very close to the historical 3.5 percent change 
found in the 1982 study as well as being very close to the 
escalation rate used for levelizing rail transport costs 
in the earlier study (Duffield and others 1982). However, 
the current analysis did indicate a possible slowing of 
the rate of increase to approximately 1 percent per year. 
This 1 percent rate was used to derive the levelized rail 
rates for 1984.
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The first year variable rail rates were assumed to be 
$0.0156 per ton-mile. Levelized over 30 years at 1 
percent per year and at real weighted cost of capital of 
3.77 percent yields a levelized variable cost of $0.0189 
per ton-mile. Because the model is run on actual (air 
mile) rectangular coordinates, this is inflated by the 
rail to air-mile ratio for each boundary.
In order to account for the substantial additional 
distance Wyoming coal must travel to the major Montana 
"low-Btu”’ market in Minnesota, a fixed transportation 
costs equivalent to an extra 200 miles was included in the 
Wyoming transportation cost function. Similarly, in 
modeling states just south of the Minnesota and Wisconsin 
borders, the difference in air to actual miles from the 
market centers required an 80 air mile addition to Wyoming 
fixed costs.
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SPATIAL MARKET MODEL PROGRAMS
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This appendix presents "short-hand" documentation for 
the computer programs used to develop the 1990 demand 
forecasts. There are ten Fortran programs involved.
Each provides specific calculations needed to forecast 
coal demand. NEWHYPE. FOR is the core model that
calculates the hyperbolic spatial market boundaries. This 
model is listed line by line in Appendix C . ELEC.FOR is 
the program used to generate electric demand forecasts. 
POP.FOR computes the percent of each state's SMSA 
population captured within either the Montana or Wyoming 
market boundary. These percentages are used to weight the 
new coal demand forecasts. ONETON.FOR makes use of 
regional projections of hydroelectric, nuclear, oil, and 
gas electric generation forecasts, to calculate the growth 
in coal demand in each state. TOM.FOR takes the residual 
forecasts made by ONETON.FOR and the population weights 
calculated by POP.FOR to forecast Montana and Wyoming coal 
demand. DATAM.FOR, MASH.FOR, MATRAN.FOR, TAX.FOR, and 
FOB.FOR are data manipulation programs.
NEHHYP.FOR (Intra-fuel Substitution)
Calculates the data coordinates for seven market
boundaries. The result is a completely bounded spacial
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market for either Montana or Wyoming coal production. 
In addition to the supply centers in Montana and Eastern 
Wyoming, the following supply centers are used: 
Colorado, Illinois, New Mexico, Texas, Utah, Washington, 
Southwest Wyoming.
Input files :
FOR22.DAT: Model plant data including O&M F6D, FOB, and
transportation costs.
READ(2 2,100,END-110)((A (I ,J ),J-1,8),I-l,18)
100 FORMAT(8F)
Output files :
F0R21.DAT: Output of market boundary coordinates.
These coordinates are used in POP.FOR.
WRITE(21,550,END-560)(AMAP(I,J),J-1,32)
550 FORMAT(' '(32(' ',F9.2))>
F0R37.DAT: Catch all file, where the run identifiers
and various responses which are output from the model
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are sent. These files are not integral to the program, 
so most of the statements are commented out from the 
program.
FOR22.DAT Variable Description
Line Coal Supply Description
# Center**
1 A & B Power Plant Size (net MW)
2 A & B Hours Operated at Full Load (hours)
3 A Power Plant Heat Rate (Btu/KWH)
4 A Coal Heat Content (Btu/lb)
5 B Power Plant Heat Rate (Btu/KWH)
6 B Coal Heat Content (Btu/lb)
7 A Power Plant Capital Cost ($/KW)
8 B Power Plant Csgpital Cost ($/KW)
9 A & B Fixed Charge Rate (decimal)
10 A Operating and Maintenance Costs ($/KWH)
11 B Operating and Maintenance Costs ($/KWH)
12 A FOB Mine Price ($/ton)
13 B FOB Mine Price ($/ton)
14 A Fixed Transportation Cost ($/ton)
15 B Fixed Transportation Cost ($/ton)
16 A Variable Transportation Costs 
(S/ton-air mile)
17 B Variable Transportation Costs 
(S/ton-air mile)
18 A & B Straight Line Distance Between A & B
• Source : Duffield and others 1985.
•’ A - Either the Montana or Wyoming Supply Center; B - The 
market competitor of A; one of seven possible coal supply 
centers.
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other important variables;
THETA: The angle from the supply center to one of seven
competing supply center.
falne of TUTft for lootoaa and lyoiiaf Supply Ceaters 
Montana Vyoaing
Coapetiny Competing
Distance m n Supply
Center
Distance THET& Supply
Center
395.7 263.32 Colorado 129.0 238.02 Colorado
1,061.5 328.29 Illinois 853.0 20.37 Illinois
663.6 256.76 lev Mexico 671.0 197.87 lev Mexico
1,106.6 299.09 Texas 792.0 327.01 Texas
521.6 237.92 Dtab 696.0 206.58 Utah
779.1 165.43 Vasbington 854.5 160.63 Masbington
321.6 243.99 SI Myoaing 181.5 171.18 SN Myoaing
252.8 286.79 BJ Myoaing 252.8 106.79 BJ Myoaing
P O P . F O R
Computes the percent of a states SMSA population that 
falls in either the Montana or Wyoming market region.
Input files I
F0R21.DAT: Boundary coordinates output from NEWHYP.FOR
READ(21,130,END-140)((AMAP(I ,J ),J-1,8)
,1-1,148)
130 FORMAT(32F)
F0R69.DAT :SMSA coordinates and population forecasts.
READ(20,110,END120((SMSA(I,J),J-1,8)
,1-1,148)
110 FORMAT(8F)
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FOR69.DAT Data
Coordinates Population Forecasts
1 T 1980 1985 1990 2000 1995 1984
Ï Ü  (04.8 177,850 166,830 166,830 184,537 178,792 168,923
560 -650.4 131,822 132,044 138,044 148,750 143,282 131,999
677.6 -694.4 393,494 395,397 412,815 443,840 428,946 395,014
(148 s m s )
Output files;
FORI5.DAT : 2xn X,Y boundary coordinates, where n - the
number of boundary locations.
WRITE(15,190,END-200)((ZHYPER(I,J),J-1,2)
,1-1,1616 
190 FORMAT(2F)
FOR17.DAT : The X,Y coordinates of the SMSA's captured
within the spacial market.
DO 590 I--1,139
WRITE(17,580)(SMINXY(I,J),J-1,2)
580 FORMAT(IX,F 6 .1,IX,F7 .1)
590 CONTINUE
F0R23.DAT: Population weights for the 21 state market.
WRITE(23,570)(OUT(I ),1,21)
570 FORMAT(IX,F )
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FOR66.DAT Data
Iowa
Kansas
Minnesota
Montana
Nebraska
North Dakota
Oklahoma
South Dakota
Wisconsin
Arkansas
Colorado
Idaho
Illinois
Michigan
Missouri
Wyoming
Louisiana
Oregon
Texas
Washington
Indiana
OUT(l) 
0UT<2) 
0UT(3) 
O UT(4) 
0UT(5) 
O U T (6) 
O U T (7) 
O UT(8) 
O UT(9) 
O UT(10) 
O U T (11) 
OUT{12) 
O UT(13) 
O UT(14) 
O UT(15) 
OUT(16) 
OUT(17) 
OUT(18) 
OUT(19) 
O U T (20) 
OUT(21)
ELEC.FOR
Generates electric demand forecast for each state in 
the market area. This is based on the 1983 kwh 
generated in each state and a constant growth rate.
Input files;
FOR42.DAT* State kwh generation for 1983.
Output files :
F0R61.DAT : Electric demand for each state for the
following years : 1983, 1984, 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000.
ONETON.FOR (Inter-fuel Substitution)
Given state electric demands, forecasted production of 
hydroelectric, nuclear, oil, and gas generation, and 
current coal generation, calculates excess electric 
demand. This residual demand represents the potential 
for growth for coal fired generation. The weights 
calculated by POP.FOR are used to identify the
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generation which will be supplied by either Montana or 
Wyoming coal producers. The result is the generation, 
kwh which will be generated by one of these two supply 
centers coal. Finally, the generation is converted 
into tons of coal.
Important Variables;
DO 1000 1-1,21 
DO 900 J-1,5
RBSID(I,J )-STAKW(I,H )-(AHYD(I,J)+AOIL(I,J)+AGAS(I 
,J )+ANUK(I,J )+COALT(I ,J ))
900 CONTINUE 
1000 CONTINUE
NBILL - 1,000,000,000 
DO 1100 1-1,21
TON(I )-((RESID(I ,K )*NBILL*COALT(1,5)/COALT(1,6)
/2000)1000 
1100 CONTINUE
Input files:
F0R31.DAT : Historic coal shipments--1983 coal
generation (kwh) for each state.
READ(31,100,END-400)((COALT(I ,J ),J-1,6),1-1,21) 
100 FORMAT(6F)
F0R43.DATJHydropower generation (kwh) for each state.
READ(43,300,END-400)((AHYD(I,J),J-1,5),1-1,21)
F0R44.DAT: Oil generation (kwh) for each state.
READ(44,300,END-400)((AOIL(I,J),J-1,5),1-1,21)
F0R45.DAT : Gas generation (kwh) for each state.
READ(45,300,END-400)((AGAS(I,J),J-1,5),1-1,21)
F0R46.DAT: Nuclear generation (kwh) for each state.
READ(43,300,END-400)((ANUK(I,J),J-1,5),1-1,21)
F0R61.DAT: State electric demand forecast--Electric
growth forecasts for 1984, 1985, 1990, 1995, and 2000.
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READ{61,4 50)((STAKW(I,J),J-1,6),I-1,21)
4 50 FORMAT(6F)
Output filest
FOR35.DAT: Supply center's coal demand forecast.
WRITE(58,1200)(TON<I),I-1,21 )
1200 FORMAT(FI5.3)
DATAM.FOR
Manipulates an (21*13*13)xl vector and converts it 
into a (21*13)xl3 matrix. This data manipulation is 
used to order the population weights so they can be 
used in TON.FOR.
Input files :
FOR51.DAT : Population weights (21*13*13)xl.
READ(51,40)(POP(I),1-1,3731)
40 FORMAT(6X,F10.7)
Output files :
FOR52.DAT: Population weights (21*13)xl3.
WRITE(52,60)((XPOP(I,J),J-1,13),1-1,287)
60 FORMAT(13F15.7 )
HASH.FOR
Takes regional population forecasts and combines them 
into one final output file. The regions are the 
Northwest (NW), Northcentral (NC), and the 
Southcentral (SC).
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Important Variables;
DO 400 J-1,13 
DO 500 1-1,287,22 
POP{I ,J )-XNWPOP(I ,J ) 
P0P{I+1)-SCPOP{I+l,J) 
POP(I+2)-SCPOP{I+2,J) 
POP{1+3)-XNCPOP(1+3,J ) 
POP(1+4)-XNWPOP(1+4,J) 
P0P(I+5)-SCP0P(I+5,J) 
POP(1+6)-XNCPOP(1+6,J ) 
POP(I+7)-SCPOP(I+7,J) 
POP(1+8)-XNCPOP(1+8,J) 
POP(1+9)-XNCPOP(1+9,J )
POP(I+10 
P0P(I+11 
POP(1+12 
P0P(I+13 
P0P(I+14 
POP(1+15 
P0P(I+16 
P0P(I+17 
P0P(I+18 
P0P(I+19 
POP(I+20 
P0P(I+21 
500 CONTINUE
400 CONTINUE
SCPOP(I+10,J) 
-SCP0P(I+11,J) 
-XNWPOP(1+12,J) 
-SCP0P(I+13,J) 
-XNCP0P(I+14,J) 
-SCP0P(I+15,J) 
-SCP0P(I+16,J) 
-SCP0P(I+17,J) 
-XNWP0P(I+18,J) 
-SCP0P(I+19,J) 
-XNWPOP(1+20,J) 
-SCPOP(1+21,J)
Input files :
F0R51.DAT: NW population weights.
READ(51,300)((XNWPOP(I,J),J-1,13),1-1,287) 
300 F0RMAT(4X,13P15.7)
FOR52.DAT: NC population weights.
READ(52,300)((XNCPOP(I,J),J-1,13),1-1,287)
F0R53.DAT : SC population weights.
READ ( 53, 300) (SCPOPd, J) , J-1,13) (1-1,287)
Output files :
F0R54.DAT: Combined population weights.
WRITE(54,300)((POP(I,J),J-1,13),1-1,287)
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TON.FOR
This program uses residual coal demand forecasts from 
ONETON.FOR and multiplies associated population
weights to forecast derived demand for Montana or 
Wyoming supply centers.
Input files:
F0R54.DAT: Combined population weights output from
MASH.FOR.
RBAD(54,10O)((POP{I,J),J-1,13),1-1,287)
1100 FORMAT(13F10.7)
FOR58.DAT: Residual coal demand.
READ(58,1100)(RESID(K),K-1,21)
Output files :
F0R56-DAT:Coal demand forecasts for 13x13 HT,WY price 
scenarios.
WRITE(56,1000)((TON(L,J),J-1,13),L-1,13)
1000 FORMAT(13F15.2)
FOR57.DAT: Coal demand forecasts by state, for 13x13
MT,WY price scenarios.
WRITE(57,1000)((STATON(I,J),J-1,13),1-1,187)
MATRAM.FOR
Transposes a 13x13 data matrix.
Input files :
F0R56.DAT : Production forecasts.
Output files:
FOR62.DAT: Transposed Production forecast.
T AX.FOR
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Updates the tax rate used to change the MT or WY FOB 
price in FOR22.DAT. This program is used in
conjunction with FOB.FOR.
Input files *
FOR50.DAT* The previous tax rate used to update the 
FOB price.
Output files :
FOR50. DAT : The current tax rate used to update the
FOB price.
FOB.FOR
Modifies the FOB mine price in FOR22.DAT. Once this 
price is updated, NEWHYP.FOR is run to generate new 
market boundaries.
Input files;
FOR50.DAT: Current tax rate used to update the
previous FOB price.
Output files;
F0R48.DAT: Corrected data file used in NEWHYP.FOR.
The file name is changed to FOR22.DAT by a batch file.
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